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This thesis deals with Chinese political power in the
Federation of Malaysia since the expulsion of Singapore
(with its large Chinese population) from the federation in
1965. In determining the extent of Chinese political power
in Malaysia, an examination of two significant areas was es-
sential. First, the racial conflict and violence between
the Malays and non-Malays (mainly the Chinese) were major
problems which shook the very foundation of the political,
economic and social structures of Malaysia. Second, the re-
sults of the last three Malaysian Parliamentary and State
Legislative Assembly General Elections were analyzed and in-
terpreted to gain a clearer picture of the Malaysian politi-
cal scene. Finally, a projection of the future political
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Lea E. Williams, in his book The Future of the Overseas
Chinese in Southeast Asia , defines an overseas Chinese as
an individual of some Chinese ancestry who views residence
abroad as compatible with Chinese cultural identity and less
certainly with some remote Chinese political orientation.
An overseas Chinese considers the expatriation from his
homeland the result of his own or his forebearers' economic
ambitions. He also regards himself as a member of the over-
seas Chinese people, which is, in turn, part of the greater
Chinese nation, and is so regarded by those around him.
Overseas Chinese communities exist in every country in
Southeast Asia to include ?4alaysia, and dot many nations of
the remainder of the globe. It is worth noting that the
Chinese population of Hong Kong does not realistically fit
any practical definition of an overseas Chinese community.
Contrary to some sources, a majority of this Chinese commu-
nity apparently consider themselves residents of a portion
of their native Kwangtung Province which just happens to be
under British control. Hong Kong's propinquity to China
mitigates aginst it being a legitimate overseas Chinese com-
munity.
The overseas Chinese have traditionally been stereotyped
as trading people, tending to be urbanized and, if not yet
financially successful, ordinarily strongly attracted by the
10

lure of commercial profits. In this capacity, the overseas
Chinese have frequently been referred to as the Jews of the
Far East. Furthermore, labels such as inscrutable, energet-
ic, hard-working, clannish, and apolitical, have habitually
followed the overseas Chinese wherever they venture. 3eing
apolitical was a deliberate choice of the overseas Chinese
for a number of reasons. In the past, they have preferred
to let some other element run the government (as long as it
was run well) so their full efforts could be devoted to eco-
nomic endeavors. Another major reason involved the overseas
Chinese community's efforts to maintain a "low profile" and
not draw undue attention upon themselves. Historically,
high levels of attention on the overseas Chinese have caused
them to be the victims of jealous and antagonistic actions
on the part of the non-Chinese population. As with all gen-
eralizations, there are exceptions and the overseas Chinese
in Malaysia proved to be such an anomaly. The Chinese ele-
ment in Malaysia has been one of the very few, if not the
only, overseas Chinese communities to vie for fair political
representation or political power through the democratic
process, the vote. The debut of the overseas Chinese chal-
lenge to the politically-dominant Malays occurred in the
elections of 1964 with the efforts of Mr. Lee Kuan Yew and
the People's Action Party (PAP) of Singapore. But the real
challenge did not materialize until the 1969 elections,
after the separation of Singapore from the Federation of




This thesis will examine the successes and failures of
the overseas Chinese community, especially the minority Chi-
nese opposition parties, in its attempts to gain fair polit-
ical representation through the election process. This
representation is a critical ingredient to the achievement




II. THE SEPARATION OF SINGAPORE FROM MALAYSIA
On 16 September 1963 » after more than two years of delib-
eration and preparation, Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and Sa-
bah united in constituting the Federation of Malaysia. The
motivations, objectives, and expectations tied up in the
merger were as diverse as the land and people of the four
units involved. On IK May 1963, the Prime Minister of
Singapore (Lee Kuan Yew) argued that the "political, econom-
ic and military reasons are so compelling that we would be
committing national suicide if we refused to merge in Malay-
2
sia." On that occasion, Lee Kuan Yew declared, probably
correctly, that the first pre-condition for the success of
Malaysia was "National unity of all the races comprising
Malaysia with undivided loyalty to the elected Central Gov-
1 ...
ernment of Malaysia."^ Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister
of Malaya, maintained that "Since the independence of Malaya,
we have made a success of everything; there is no reason why
k ...
we can't make Malaysia a success too." Both Prime Minis-
ters, Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Tunku Abdul Rahman of
Malaya, appeared to be profoundly committed to the concept
of the newly created Federation of Malaysia.
Yet, on 9 August 1965i the State of Singapore was sepa-
rated from the Federation of Malaysia. R. S. Milne compared
Malaya and Singapore to Siamese twins, who could be separat-
ed only with damage to the health of at least one of the
13

children. Yet, they were separated in a bloodless but trau-
matic operation. For the Tunku, the news of separation,
which he announced to the Malaysian Parliament, was "the




" For Lee, "it is a moment of anguish. All my life,
my whole adult life, I have believed in merger and unity of
Q
the two territories. ... It broke everything we stood for."
The most striking characteristic of the partial dissolution
of the two-year-old federation was the suddenness and final-
ity of the split between the Central Government of Malaysia
and the State of Singapore. Within two years, internal divi-
siveness between the Malay-dominated Alliance government of
Prime Minister Rahman and the predominantly Chinese State of
Singapore, governed by Lee Kuan Yew's People's Action Party
Q
(PAP), proved the decisive cetrifugal force. In retrospect,
the break was inevitable, given the issues and the personal-
lties involved.
The sources of conflict between the Central Government
and the Singapore Government which culminated in the expul-
sion of Singapore on 9 August 1965, were numerous and quite
conspicuous. In reality, the key events were primarily po-
litical and racial in nature. These included the decision
of the PAP to contest several state seats at the 1964 Malay-
an elections and to establish branches in the main towns of
Malaya, the communal riots in Singapore in 1964, the propos-
al of the PAP that there should be a "Malaysian Malaysia"
as opposed to a "Malay Malaysia," and the formation of a
14

National Solidarity Convention to support a "Malaysian Malay-
sia." Additional sources of friction which perpetuated the
conflict, included personal differences between the two
Prime Ministers and disputes over the division of tax reve-
nue, a common market, pioneer industries, the 1965 federal
budget, the closure of the 3ank of China in Singapore, and
the control of broadcasting and television. In the final
analysis, it was the intertwining of political and communal
differences and the subsequent threat of racial violence
that tipped the balance toward the separation of Singapore
from the Federation of Malaysia.
A. POLITICAL RIVALRY
After Malaysia Day in 19 63, Singapore's political envi-
ronment became too' restrictive for the ambitious and impa-
tient PAP hierarchy. Lee Kuan Yew was only the de facto
leader of a small Opposition in the federal parliament,
tightly controlled by the massive majority of the government
1
1
Alliance Party,* the multi -ethnic coalition comprised of
the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), Malaysian
Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress
(MIC). In April 1964, the PAP made the decision to extend
its party apparatus to the Malayan peninsula by entering the
Malayan elections (primarily in the urban constituencies
with substantial Chinese populations) to the federal parlia-
ment. The PAP leaders, who have often described themselves
as being "calculating," welcomed the opportunity of extend-
12mg their calculations over the Malaysian abacus.
15

The decision of Singapore's People's Action Party to
participate in the Malayan state and parliamentary elections
of April, 1964, was probably the most crucial it was to make
in the course of its dispute with the Alliance Party and the
13Central Government. J In UMNO's hostile view, the PAP's
ill-concealed objective was to make Lee Kuan Yew the first
Chinese prime minister of Malaysia and add Chinese political
domination to their existing stranglehold over the Malaysian
XL
economy. The Alliance leadership on the mainland consid-
ered the PAP venture a direct challenge to Alliance suprem-
acy while the Malays regarded it as Chinese defiance of a
political arrangement which guaranteed Malay paramountcy.
In the end, the PAP, in its first major attempt to win a
place for itself on the national political scene, succeeded
only in embittering federal-state relations, incurring the
wrath of the Malays, confirming the Tunku's distrust of Lee,
and opening the political field to a deadly racial battle. ^
On 1 March 1964, Dr. Ton Chin Chye, Deputy Prime Minis-
ter of Singapore, announced that the PAP would compete for a
small number of seats in the Malayan state and parliamentary
elections in April. He then presented the argument that the
PAP, which was a leading force in the formation of Malaysia,
had to regard itself as a national-level organization. Dr.
Toh stressed that his party had no intention of capturing
the Central government, but wanted to play a wider part in
building Malaysia "instead of being cornered like a rat in
Singapore." 16 within five years, he said, the PA? hoped to
be "a force to be reckoned with" in Malaysia, 1 ?
16

The PAP Election Manifesto delineated two party objec-
tives for the ?4alayan election competition. The long-term
objective was "to assist in the building of a united demo-
cratic and socialist Malaysia, based on the principles of
18
social justice and non-communalism. " The immediate objec-
tive was "to ensure that the Socialist Front (an alliance
between the Parti Ra'ayat or People's Party, a rural Malay
element, and the Labour Party of Malaya, an urban Chinese
organization) does not benefit from the substantial protest
19
votes against the MCA."" 7 An Indian official of the PAP ex-
pressed his party's objectives somewhat more succinctly?
Our long-range objective, quite frankly, is to start a
social revolution in Malaysia and break down the communal
walls in this country. Our short-term objective is just
as clear. We want to defeat the Socialist Front and the
Malayan Chinese Association, and by doing so prove to the
Tunku that we are the only party that can appeal to pro-
gressive-minded Malaysians in the cities of this country. 20
During the 1964 campaign, four themes emerged and per-
vaded the PAP's pronouncements and activities. First, the
PAP's token participation was deliberate in the expectation
that it would generate a minimum amount of disruption to the
Malay political organization. Commented Lee prophetically}
We believe that any massive intervention in the elections
can be misinterpreted and will be presented to the rural
Malays as an attempt to challenge Umno. This will be bad
for Malaysia for it will encourage extremist Malay ele-
ments to work up feeling that with merger and Malaysia the
position of the Malays has been endangered and the Chinese
in the towns are making a bid for power. 21
The election of 1964 was regarded as a prelude to the prover-
bial main event, the election of 1969. In Lee's words, "If
it is possible to get the winds of change to blow in gently
17

this year so much less of an upset it will be all round in
221969." Although the PAP registered candidates for only
11 parliamentary and 15 assembly seats (all in urban areas),
an even lesser number (9) of the parliamentary candidates
actually campaigned. The inadequacy of the PAP's organiza-
tional effort was reflected in the defeat of all but one of
23its nine candidates. J
Second, the PAP leaders made it clear that their party
was not opposing UMNO, nor the Tunku, nor any part of the
Malay leadership of the Alliance." The PAP announced that
two of its nominees for Johore constituencies would not cam-
paign because, contrary to PA? expectations, their Alliance
2*5
opponents were UMNO and not MCA members. -' Throughout the
campaign, Lee stressed the importance of retaining the Tun-
ku' s leadership at this crucial moment when the nation was
facing Indonesian Confrontation (Indonesia aggressively
pledged to "crush Malaysia" as a 3ritish-conceived, "neo-
colonial" creation)
:
. . . the only coherent and effective leadership that can
build a Malaysia separate from Indonesia is that of the
Tengku and Tun Razak in Umno, . . . For Malaysia to suc-
ceed, we must help the Tengku' 3 leadership to succeed. 26
Lee announced that all Malaysians were in the "same boat"
and no better hands were available to pilot this vessel than
the Tunku' s. But, he added, the PAP can help him navigate
27by pointing out rocks and perils m its path.
Third, the PAP proposed certain social and economic
changes in Malaysia which might help to narrow the gap be-
tween the urban and rural populations and between the "haves"
18

and the "have nots." Said Lee:
If it can be shown that the people in the bigger towns in
Malaya support Malaysia by supporting pro-Malaysia parties,
better still, if it can be shown that they support an eco-
nomic and social policy similar to that of Singapore, it
will give us added strength in convincing the Umno leader-
ship that this policy should be adopted in Malaya, particu-
larly when these policies will benefit the rural Malays
even more. 29
The fourth theme was the PAP's direct competition with
the Malayan Chinese Association and the Socialist Front,
Lee argued that while the present Malay leadership of the
Tunku and Tun Razak in UMNO "is vital to the survival and
success of Malaysia, the Chinese leadership in the Alliance
as represented by the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) is
30
replaceable, "^ It is unclear whether Lee believed or de-
sired that his party actually would be taken into the Alli-
ance Party in place of the MCA, but it is clear that he
31foresaw some subsequent cooperation between the PAP and UMNO.
The PAP quickly proceeded with its plan to participate
in the election once the decision was made. PA? headquar- -
ters were established in Kuala Lumpur, and gradually, new
branches were opened in the areas in which PAP candidates
32
were contesting. In addition to establishing a party
election machine on the peninsula, PAP leaders conducted a
search throughout Malaya for probable candidates to carry
the PAP standard.
The reactions of the Tunku and his Alliance Party over
the actuality and basis of the PAP's participation in the
Malayan elections were characterized by profound distress,
deep irritation and extreme anger. To the Tunku this
19

participation was not only contrary to an earlier pledge
which the Tunku felt Lee had made, but it was also, in the
Tunku 's eyes, an attempt to go back on the constitutional
arrangements by which Singapore was accepted into the feder-
ation: the limitation of Singapore's representation in Par-
33liament to 15 seats, JJ
This earlier pledge involved the interpretations of the
scope and meaning of specific provisions of the Malaysian
Federal Constitution. In addition to the arrangement of
limiting Singapore to 15 of the 159 seats in the Federal
Parliament, which did not specifically prohibit Singapore-
based parties from attempting to enhance their representa-
tion by contesting seats in other sections of the federation,
Singapore citizens could not vote or run for federal and
state office in the Malayan states. Although both Singapore
and Malayan leaders concurred on these constitutional provi-
sions—designed by the Alliance Party hierarchy to insulate
Malaya politically from Singapore—their interpretations of
the extent and intent of these arrangements differed greatly.
In the Tunku' s view, Singapore politicians were to confine
their activities to Singapore:
When Singapore came into this new nation of Malaysia, we
had agreed under the Constitution that she should have
representation in our Parliament and fit into the pattern
by having her own administrative machinery, and her own
elections. The first sign of Singapore's attempt to have
a hand in the affairs of Malaysia was in the last elec-
tions when the PAP contested some of the constituencies.
That was quite contrary to what we agreed. 3^
Though there are indications that Lee personally promised
the Tunku that the PAP would not contest the 1964 Malayan
20

elections, there is no evidence that any such promise was
made with the agreement of the PAP leadership, nor that this
moratorium would be extended beyond the 196^ elections. ^
Yet it is clear, from his actions and statements, that the
Tunku expected and intended that the leaders of Singapore
should take little or no part in the national politics and
government of Malaysia.
The PAP's assault on the MCA also elicited deep resent-
ment from the Tunku. Throughout the campaign he reiterated
his determination to stick with the MCA and rebuffed PAP ad-
vances despite what he termed "our own internal party
troubles. "^ 6
Tan Siew Sin, President of the MCA, and Dato Syed Jaf-
far Albar, Secretary General of UMNO, were the central fig-
ures directing the Alliance Party's strategy in the clash
against the PAP. Tan believed that the PAP's actions were
a direct "challenge to the MCA as to whether it is the PAP
17
or the MCA that should represent the Chinese in Malaysia. " J{
The orientation of Jaffar Albar* s campaign against the PAP
provided a hint to the racial conflict which exploded in
Singapore a few months after the Malayan elections. More
ominously, he spoke of the "pathetic" plight of the Malays
in Singapore under Lee's rule, saying that "Lee Kuan Yew is
so contemptuous of the Malays that his Government refused to
appoint any Malay to serve on statutory bodies in Singapore."-^
As was previously disclosed, the PAP was soundly defeat-
ed—the biggest surprise of the election. The results of
21

the April 25 balloting revealed that the Alliance prevailed
in 89 of the 104 parliamentary seats, an unprecedented feat.
In voting for state assemblies, the Alliance captured 241
39
seats, the PAP none. p While the MCA made the most substan-
tial Alliance gains, the PAP managed to poll only 16.3
percent of the valid votes cast in the parliamentary constit-
uencies. . . and 13 • 9 percent in the state constituencies.
The PAP Central Executive Committee attributed the election
defeat to "the sense of national solidarity in defense of
Malaysia under the threat from Indonesia. ..." It ap-
peared quite evident that the PAP operation on the peninsula
was inadequately organized. In addition, it was blatantly
obvious that the PA? failed to do its "homework" in selec-
ting candidates, emphasizing the relevant issues, and commu-
nicating with the Malayan people.
From the time of its Malayan election defeat, the PAP
seemed to turn its efforts more and more clearly towards
opposition to the Alliance and the Central government, and
to have given up the idea of joining and cooperating with
42
the Tunlcu and his political entourage. The eventual con-
flict transcended political boundaries and spilled over in-
to the racial scene resulting in disaster for the country
as a whole.
1 . The Singapore Riots
During a procession of Muslims celebrating the Proph-
et's birthday on 21 July 1964, communal riots exploded and
continued sporadically for almost a week. This violence
22

resulted in 22 reported deaths and nearly 500 injuries. ^
It has been reported that on the eve of the riots, leaflets
urging Malays to kill Chinese were distributed in Singapore,
and the markings on these leaflets read, "Singapore Malay
National Action Committee.
"
The PAP accused the communal politicking of Jaffar Albar,
Utusan Melayu (a Malay newspaper printed in Jawi script and
connected to several UMNO leaders who had sizeable share
holdings) , and the Singapore UMNO branch as being responsi-
ble for the violence. Lee, in a radio broadcast on the
first night of the riots, said that "All the indications
show that there has been organization and planning behind
this outbreak to turn it into an ugly communal clash." J On
the other hand, the three accused parties reciprocated by
blaming the riots on what they stated was the "PA?*3 attempt
to humiliate the Malay community in Singapore and to divide
la
it." The Tunku, in Washington at the time of the outbreak,
claimed that he had evidence that Indonesia was behind the
rioting and commented with dismay, "This is the most unhap-
piest moment of my life. Nothing like this has happened in
Ln
my country before," '
Both Lee and the Tunku were genuinely and justifiably
perturbed by the communal riots. In a speech in Singapore a
month after the outbreak, the Tunku again blamed the riots
on Indonesians who, he claimed, had stirred up the legiti-
LQ
mate grievances of the Singapore Malays. Lee left the
problem in the Tunku* s hands and apparently tried his best
23

to keep from assessing blame? his own conviction as to Al-
bar's and UMNO's responsibility, however, his own conviction
was difficult to hide.
On 2 September 1964, new communal rioting erupted in
Singapore, apparently fomented on this occasion by Indone-
sian agents. The Tunku repeated his charge that Indonesian
agents discovered fertile ground in the grievances of the
Malays in Singapore:
The trouble in Singapore arose because the Malays there
felt themselves neglected and despised. They expected
the Government to improve their lot but the State Govern-
ment of Singapore made no provision for special treatment
of one particular race or community. They, therefore,
felt aggrieved. So it needed only a little incitement to
start off trouble. 5°
Mot only were the Singapore riots distressing in them-
selves because of the destruction and loss of life they had
caused, but they also made clear the potential danger in-
volved in rousing racial sentiments through political agita-
tion, the explosiveness of the Singapore community, and the
possible disaster which could take place throughout Malaysia
should racial passions be inflamed.
2. Malaysian Solidarity Convention
In May and June of 1965, the heated dispute between
the Singapore and Central governments reached the crisis
stage and ultimately a climax. Beginning with the PAP's 10th
Anniversary Congress in November, 1964, there had been talk
of the establishment of a united opposition front composed of
all pro-Malaysia opposition parties. The proposed front
was envisioned by PAP leaders as an instrument through
24

which to fight for the principle of equality embodied in the
"Malaysian Malaysia" concept and through which to promote
democratic socialism and parliamentary democracy. J Lee was
perhaps somewhat less idealistic in his assessment of the
front when he commented:
if it is necessary to have a Malaysian Malaysia through
such a group of parties making an effort to win the major-
ity of seats in Malaysia to form the Government, well so
be it. It has to be done. 5^
In April, 19^5 » in the wake of intensified efforts by
leaders of the Malayan Alliance Party to strengthen their
sister organization in Singapore, * a Malaysian National
Alliance Party was formed by merging the four separate Alli-
ance parties of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak.
This merger of Alliance parties throughout Malaysia provided
the impetus for the implementation of the proposed united
opposition front.
On 9 May 196^, five Malaysian opposition parties assem-
bled in Singapore and formulated the Malaysian Solidarity
Convention. These five parties included the People* s Action
Party (PAP); the People's Progressive Party of Malaya (???),
the champion of the cause of the Chinese schools; the United
Democratic Party of Malaya (UD?) ; the moderate faction of
the leftist Sarawak United People's Party (3UPP), an essen-
tially Chinese -based but multi-racial party whose primary
objective called for the independence of Sarawak; and
MACHINDA, a relatively new and small Sarawak party. These
parties spanned the Malaysian political spectrum from center
right to far left. Only the PAP and SUPP had proved
25

substantial local appeal, and the prospect of affiliation
with the Malaysian Solidarity Convention caused a serious
internal crisis m SUPP. jr '
Although the Malaysian Solidarity Convention was predom-
inantly the incorporation of the political ideology which
Lee and his PAP had consistently expounded, the brittle
unity of the new movement was apparently based on it mem-
bers' mutual fear of Malay communalism. In principle the
general aims of the Convention were unexceptionable: the
promotion of parliamentary democracy and prevention of the
identification of the nation with the interests or supremacy
of any one community or race.-' The Convention charged that
the Alliance party was a conglomerate of communal parties
with communal cooperation being confined to the top leader-
ship echelons of the individual parties. Lee called for the
creation of a truly non-communal society through the com-
plete destruction of the communal structures and the recon-
struction of a non-communal party from the basement to the
roof—a "Malaysian Malaysia."
The proposal and the Convention itself evoked a violent
reaction from many Alliance stalwarts in Malaya who termed
it an insidious plot and a device to put Lee into a position
to capture the Central government. 7 Alliance leaders were
particularly distressed, it appears, because the new Conven-
tion made clear the significance of one of the great un-
knowns in the Malaysian political scene: the possible
26

future political complexion and sympathies of the people of
Sarawak and Sabah. The continuance of Malay political su-
premacy was now in serious question.
In the final analysis, the foundation of the National
Solidarity Convention did more to accentuate, rather than
diminish, the racial aspects of the conflict. 3y the middle
of 1965, the conflict was being ventilated increasingly in
racial terms. In the Tunku's opinion, of the many problems




The conflict between Singapore and the Central Govern-
ment and the eventual separation itself cannot be completely
understood without considering the most volatile and most
fundamental factor involved—that of race. Virtually every
aspect of the Singapore -Malaya dispute became entangled in
the racial embroilment, and it was in the context of this
controversy that other considerations—economic, political,
62
and ideological—assumed such critical proportions.
Since Malaysia is a multi-racial country, the potential
for problems surfacing from a racially-mixed society had
been recognized and scrutinized. Under the auspices of con-
stitutional documentation, the Malays have continually been
accorded special privileges especially an insured political
dominance, to equalize the obvious economic paramountcy of
the mere ambitious and harder-working non-Malays.
27

Although the Malays prevailed numerically over the Chi-
nese population on the peninsula, the latter constituted a
solid 1% of the inhabitants in Singapore. Consequently,
the Borneo States of Sarawak and Sabah were incorporated in-
to the Federation of Malaysia for the express purpose of
counterbalancing the Chinese population in Singapore. In
the new federation of Malaysia, the Malays constituted 39 -^
percent of the population; Chinese 42.3 percent; indigenous
peoples, 6.7 percent; Indians and Pakistanis, 9*3 percent. ^
Racial distrust and dislike within Malaya had long been
6k
covered over with a veneer of harmony. Although the Chi-
nese and Malays enjoyed and became secure with their respec-
tive economic and political ascendancy, the formation of
Malaysia 3hook the guarded security of the Malay people.
The belated Malay realization that their race no longer en-
joyed a numerical majority or even a plurality in the Feder-
ation of Malaysia as it did in former Malaya, resulted in a
pronounced fear of a Chinese -takeover. Lee Kuan Yew became
the central figure accentuating this fear of the Malays,
Lee himself reportedly said that he would like to be Prime
Minister only if it would benefit as a whole. -7
1 . "Malaysian Malaysia "
The political and communal aspects of the conflict
were interwoven to a point that separation of these distinct
factors had become impossible. The PAP's concept of a
"Malaysian Malaysia" presented an extremely sensitive and
crucial issue in the racial dispute. The PAP was determined
28

on creating a common Malaysian identity—non-communal or Ma-
laysian Malaysia—among the varied nationalities of the fed-
eration. As it was described by the Malaysian Solidarity
Convention, "A Malaysian Malaysia means that the nation and
the state is not identified with the supremacy, well-being
and the interests of any one particular community or race."
Alliance leaders countered that the Alliance had
accepted the principle of a Malaysian Malaysia even before
67Malaysia itself had been formed. Through these views,
which were announced publicly, the differences between the
Alliance Party and the FAP were not in the final objective
but in the method of approach and the time-phasing involved
in the attainment of the goal. Lee Kuan Yew expressed the
following point of view:
'He both want to get a Malaysian Malaysia, be we propose
route "A", direct from many States together into one fed-
eration, from many groups together into a multi-racial
party, towards a multi-racial, united Malaysia. They say
'No, let us go slowly—separate States—Singapore differ-
ent from Malaya. You keep to Singapore, please don't in-
terfere in Malaya. We will run things for you, but we
will try to get to the point of a multi-racial Malaysia. °S
Dr. Ismail Bin Dato Abdul Rahman, Malaysian Minister of In-
ternal Security and Home Affairs, put it in this manner:
There are two ways of establishing a Malaysian Malaysia.
First is the platform of the PAP—noncommunalism straight-
away. The other—the method adopted by the Alliance—re-
quires two steps. First, inter-racia^ harmony; second,
an ultimate state of non-communalism. &9
The Tunku made the following statement on the issue:
Young men . . . want to rush things. Instead of doing
what they want in a quiet and practical way, they tread
on everybody's toes, knock everybody's head and bring
about chaos, suspicion, misunderstanding, hatred and
trouble. . . . The suggestion from these young leaders
29

is that you can do this (demolish the dividing wall among
the races) overnight without making any attempt to put
the timbers in shape. Why rush? After all, the nation
will live many long years. Why not take time to make a
strong nation?70
Lee's concept of a non-communal Malaysia which would
permit all racial groups to compete for political power on an
equality basis, was designed to produce a predominantly Chi-
nese government. If this societal process was allowed to
proceed, Lee's dream of Chinese political supremacy would
most likely have been a reality. The Tunku's gradual wearing
away of communal walls would assure Malay political control
for the present, and perhaps also in the long-run when the
Malays reach that theoretical condition of overall readiness
. . . 71
to compete with the Chinese from a position of equality. '
2. Malay Special Privileges
A second significant factor in the communal dispute
revolved around Malay rights and privileges. These special
privileges had been granted to the Malays in an attempt
first, to give them a feeling of security and to compensate,
particularly in the political sphere, for the ambition and
energy of the Chinese; and second, to "uplift" the Malays so
72
that they could eventually compete with the Chinese. ; Lee
attacked Malay privileges on the grounds that they did not
achieve their second objective:
While we uphold special privileges for Malays in the con-
stitution, we believe that the crux of the problem is how
to raise the living standards of the rural people, who are
mainly Malays. Their standards of living are not advanced
by special rights for a small number of special Malays
.... Special privileges will only help a small group
of Malay bourgeoisie to become capitalists, who will later
exploit the poorer section of the people of all races. 73
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In the words of Singapore Minister for Social Affairs Inche
Othman Wok: "The special Malay rights should be an incen-
tive to the Malays to work doubly hard to improve their liv-
ing and not as an excuse for them to hide behind." ' Lee
further declared that, in accordance with the Constitution,
the privileges granted to the Malays were not political in
nature but economically and socially oriented. Thus, he
maintained, the Malays had no special right to rule
7<
Malaysia. J
The Alliance Party supported Malay privileges on the
grounds that they did achieve their first objective (to give
the Malays security and to compensate for the dynamism of
the other communities) , and that they were absolutely neces-
sary in order to insure the Malays against domination by the
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other communities. The Tunku argued:
Our aim to establish a system of parity, not only polit-
ically but economically, would leave no one out or unable
to compete in the forward march of the new Malaysia, . . .
Ultimately the time will come when it will be possible by
legislative action to amend the Constitution because this
special position will no longer be needed, ... It would
be foolish, however, to hasten the day of revision of
these constitutional rights prematurely. 77
Commenting that the Malays constituted only one percent of
the business-force and only 15 percent of the university
students, the Tunku warned:
If these rights are taken away what hope is there for the
Malays to survive in their own country? ... If the Ma-
lays are not given protection you will find that they will
join the ranks of extremists and in the course of time you




Two protagonists, the Malay "ultras" and the Malay
newspaper Utusan Melayu
.
played significant roles in the
communal dispute. As in most nations of the world, the Fed-
eration of Malaya and its successor, Malaysia, had its share
of vehement nationalists (Malay) who occupied key government
and political party positions. These ardent Malay national-
ists included the UMNO Secretary-General Jaffar Albar, Lan-
guage and Literature Agency Director Syed Nasir, and Minis-
ter of Information and Broadcasting Inche 3enu who also head-
ed the UMNO Youth Organization. It was Lee Kuan Yew who
7Q
gave these Malay "ultra-nationalists" their label,' 7 and, by
doing so, may have provided them the catalyst to consolidate
their position and achieve nationwide support.
The Tunku attempted to exert some control over the
extremists and their antagonistic comments, When his moder-
ating efforts failed, the Tunku refused to take any drastic
action against them. Consequently, the power of the Malay
"ultras" in party and government affairs increased signifi-
cantly during the last two months of the conflict especially
with the absence of the Tunku' s moderating influence. In-
deed, the theory has been advanced that at the time of the
break, the Tunku was losing his control of the extremists
and perhaps also of his party. In an undated letter to
Dr. Ton, in a last-minute effort to convince the Singapore




If I were strong enough and able to exercise complete con-
trol of the situation I might perhaps have delayed action,
but I am not, and so while I am able to counsel tolerance
and patience I think the amicable settlement of our dif-
ferences in this way is the only possible way out.^1
The Tunku subsequently tried to explain that the phrase "if
I were strong enough" had no reference to his ability to
82
control his party or the country. Even if one believed
that the Tunku was in control of the extremists, one could
not deny the increasing frequency in which the latter began
speaking on behalf of the Malay people. Apparently acting
on their own initiative, the extremists persuasively played
upon the Malays* fear that their status in the country was
being seriously threatened, and were quite successful in
doing so.
Utusan Melayu , a Malay newspaper printed in Jawi
script, also participated and succeeded in accentuating the
communal dispute. The paper printed editorials designed to
incite communal differences and presented the news with a
definite Malay-nationalist slant. Utusan Melayu reportedly
was controlled by certain UMNO leaders, including the Mentri
Besar of Trengganu who was the Chairman of the paper's 3oard
of Directors. J
C. SEPARATION
While the Tunku was attending a conference in London
(June 1965) , the war of words which were now expressed al-
most exclusively in racial terms, continued to such a degree
that drastic action was imminent. In addition, the dispute
had spilled over into the international arena as the Central
33

Government became the target of some critical press editori-
als in Britain. The Tunku professed to be puzzled and hurt
by all the trouble in Malaysia:
Why do we want to say all these things? We are a happy
people. ... I wanted to be an elder statesman and* help
resolve issues worrying one party or another ... if
there is still something worrying Mr. Lee, I will be glad
to look into it and see how best we can settle things. 3^
Before he could look into anything, the Tunku entered the
London Clinic (25 June) suffering from a painful attack of
shingles. While he was in the clinic, he apparently re-
versed his views. He later disclosed that while in the hos-
pital (presumably in a depressed state of mind) he got down




laysia. D The Tunku' s initial d ision on separation was
apparently made on 29 June 1965.
Although the Tunku' s 29 June decision on separation was
made, it was by no means irreversible. Referring to the de-
cision, Felix Abisheganadan , a veteran Malaysian journalist,
wrote (after an interview with the Tunku on 9 August 1965,
the day of separation) that, 'If there could be no agreement
with the PAP to call off the heavy politicking which he (the
Tunku) feared would lead to racial bloodshed, * the Tunku had
87
felt that Singapore had to go. The Tunku instructed Tun
Razak (his deputy) to proceed with the legal chores neces-
sary before separation could be effected only on 25 July
88
1965. Further, shortly after making his decision of 29
June, the Tunku wrote a letter to Tun Razak outlining the
lines of his thinking, asking Razak to discuss separation
3^

with the Cabinet seniors, and requesting the Deputy Prime
Minister to meet with Lee Kuan Yew to try to eliminate the
39
causes of friction. At Lee's request, he and Razak met
on 20 July 19&5 (prior to the arrival of the Tunku *s letter
in Kuala Lumpur) with very negative results. It clearly
indicated that there was little possibility of an end to
90
the. war of words. On 29 July 1965, Tun Razak again met
Lee in what was later reported to have been 'one of Tun Ra-
zak' s last efforts to heal the rift between the State and
91Central Government. ,y Of this meeting Razak later revealed:
'I met Mr. Lee. I found it impossible. Our minds did not
92
meet on most points.' ;.'/hen asked if Lee knew the conse-
quences of what would happen if he did not see eye to eye
with the Central Government, Tun Razak replied, 'Certainly
93he did. ' ^ According to Lee, he was not convinced that
there was no other way out than separation until his meeting
with the Tunku on 7 August 19o5« '
In his "breakaway" speech, the Tunku revealed that two
alternatives had been open to him. The first course of ac-
tion involved taking repressive measures against the leaders
of the Singapore Government. The second option was to sever
all relations with Singapore. The former course was rejec-
ted, because it was contrary to his idea of parliamentary
democracy and because in the long run it would increase
95
rather than diminish the prospect of communal violence. '^
With the threat of imminent communal violence staring
him in the face, the Tunku was compelled to confront the
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situation and then make the most important decision in the
short existence of Malaysia. On 22 July 1965, Tunku Abdul
Rahman received a reply from Tun Razak stating •all the se-
nior Cabinet Ministers' (he, Dato Dr. Ismail, Tan Siew Sin,
and V. T. Sambanthan) were agreed that no agreement with
96Singapore could be reached and that Singapore should be
separated. The full agreement of his Cabinet seniors was
probably a decisive event in the Tunku' s decision-making,
for on 25 July, he wrote back to Tun Razak instructing the
latter to 'proceed with the legal chores and the amendments
to the Constitution' and to arrange for the recall of
97Parliament. 7 '
The Tunku flew into Singapore in the early hours of
5
-August 1965 and met with four of his senior Cabinet Minis-
ters to discuss the situation. The meeting concluded with
what was inevitable—that there was no alternative to imme-
diate separation. Therefore, the decision was probably made
irreversible on 6 August 1965* That evening, Dr. C-oh Keng
Swee and several other PAP leaders, who had been in the fed-
eral capital for a few days, were informed of the break de-
cision. On 7 August 1965 # the Tunku summoned Lee from a
golf game in the Cameron Highlands, some eighty-five miles
north of Kuala Lumpur, and told him that if Singapore did
not quit the federation there would be bloodshed, Lee,
who hoped the situation could still be saved, found the Tun-
ku completely resolute and reluctantly accepted what he
called the Tunku 's "intuitive" judgment. When the
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parliamentary session opened in Kuala Lumpur, August 9, the
Government introduced a constitutional amendment which would
formalize the decision reached by the Prime Minister and a
handful of selected cabinet members. Earlier, the Singa-
pore Cabinet had reluctantly approved the agreement. For
two and one half hours the House of Representatives listened
to the Prime Minister's explanations and the stunned opposi-
tion's questions and then passed the amendment 126-0, with
one opposition member abstaining and the rest absent.
The separation was announced simultaneously by Lee and the
Tunku on 9 August 1965 » and took everybody by complete
surprise.
It would be a considerable task to assess how close to
racial violence Malaysia actually was at the time of the
separation. Certainly this was the fundamental reason giv-
. . 102
en by the Tunku for his break decision. It appears that
the Tunku's fear of imminent large-scale racial violence was
real and genuine. Several American officials who were in
Malaysia at the time of the break report that communal ten-
sion was indeed high, and that a continuation of the dispute
at its present intensity might well have resulted in
bloodshed. 103
However, the expulsion of Singapore from the federation
did not completely remove the non-Malay political opposition
or the racial problems which plagued the country. This was
evidenced by the 13 May 1969 communal riots which followed
the West Malaysian elections, and the fear of racial vio-
lence which haunted the August 197^ national elections.
37

Since the separation of Singapore and the removal of the
political threat in the form of Lee Kuan Yew and his PAP,
how have the overseas Chinese fared in the Malaysian polit-
ical arena? The following chapters will attempt to assess
the extent to which the overseas Chinese have influenced the
politics in West Malaysia.
38

III. FROM THE SEPARATION TO THE 1969 ELECTIONS
A recapitulation of the 196^ elections reveals that the
Alliance, the dominant party formed "by the coalition of the
United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and the Malayan
Chinese Association (MCA) , had apparently achieved a re-
sounding victory. Alliance candidates were victorious in
89 of 10^ seats in the Federal Parliament, fifteen more than
in 1959. The People's Action Party (PAP), which directly
challenged the MCA for the votes of the Chinese community in
eleven constituencies, won only one seat. The opposition
from the liberal Left, another intercommunal coalition, the
Socialist Front, composed of the (largely Chinese and Indian)
Labour Party and the (Malay) Partai Rakyat lost seven of the
u u 10^nine seats it previously held.
However, a closer scrutiny of the election showed that
the MCA triumphs had been possible only with the assistance
of Malay votes, not the confidence of the Chinese community.
The MCA's image as a conservative, middle-class party, and
its repeated compromises with UMNO on crucial issues, partic-
ularly education, damaged its appeal to Chinese voters.
In reality, "the members of the MCA were drawn from the
property-owning walthy class, big business, finance and in-
dustry." Consequently, the mass of the Chinese poorer
adult population became disfranchised. 3y 1969 f the chal-
lenge of communal appeals became increasingly pronounced.
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The post-separation period continued to demonstrate a
complete Malay domination of politics at all levels of gov-
ernment, from the national Parliament to the state assem-
blies. This supremacy was effected by an ethnic group which
barely comprised half of the total population in the Federa-
tion of Malaysia. Based on the West Malaysian censuses of
1957 and 1970, one can deduce that a comparatively even
fluctuation developed in the population of the two major
ethnic groups, the Malays and Chinese (Table I and Figures
1-12) . The proportion of Chinese in West Malaysia, as de-
lineated in the 1957 and 1970 censuses, decreased from 37^
to 35# while the Malay community increased from 50^ to 53$
•
Logically, none of the individual states of West Malaysia
exhibited any appreciable percentage shift in the population
of their respective Malay and Chinese communities (Table I
and Figures 1-11) . Since the ratio of the Chinese populace
in West Malaysia remained relatively constant between the
two censuses, one can compare these figures with the per-
centage of Chinese occupying important federal and state
government posts in 19^5 and following years to determine if
the Chinese community has been fairly represented in the
politics of West Malaysia.
After the separation of Singapore on 9 August 1965, the
22-member Cabinet (Table II) of the Federation of Malaysia
included only four Chinese ministers, all from the small but
elite MCA. These four members gave the Chinese only an 18$
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Figure 1. Johore, Population Distribution







Figure 2. Xedah, Population Distribution










Figure J, Kelantan, Population Distribution









Figure k. Malacca, Population Distribution










Figure 5» Negeri Sembilan, Population









Figure 6, Fahang, Population Distribution













Figure 7. Penang, Population Distribution







Figure 8, Perak, Population Distribution











Figure 9. Perlis, Population Distribution








Figure 10, Selangor, Population Distribution










Figure 11. Trengganu, Population Distribution









Figure 12. West Malaysia, Population













Figure 13. Sabah, Population Distribution









Figure 1^. Sarawak, Population Distribution




1965 CA3INET OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA
Prime Minister Abdul Rahman
Deputy Prime Minister ....... . . Abdul Razak
Minister of External Affairs Abdul Rahman
Minister of Defence Abdul Razak
Minister of Home Affairs . . . Ismail bin Dato* Abdul Rahman
Minister of Justice . Ismail bin Dato' Abdul Rahman
Minister of Finance .... ..... Tan Slew Sin **
Minister of National & Rural Development .... .Abdul Razak
Minister of Culture, Youth i- Sports Abdul Rahman
Minister of Works, Posts & Telecommunications . VT Sambanthan
Minister of Transport . Sardon bin Kaji Jubir
Minister of Education ......... Mohammed Khir Johari
Minister of Health Bahaman bin Samsudin
Minister of Commerce & Industry ........ Lim Sv/ee Aun **
Minister of Welfare Services . . , Abdul Kamid Khan bin Haji
Sakhawat Ali Khan
Minister of Local Government & Housing Khaw Kai-3oh **
Minister of Sarawak Affairs ....... Jugah anak Barieng
Minister of Labour V. Manic kavasagam
Minister of Information & Broadcasting ....... Senu bin
Abdul Rahman
Minister of Agriculture & Co-operatives . . Mohammed Ghazali
bin Haji Jawi
Minister of Lands i Mines Abdul-Rahman bin Ya'kub
Minister without Portfolio ........... Ong Yc!<e Lin **
Sourcei Malay Mail. Malaysia Ye~r -00k, 1^65 (Kuala Lumpur:
Malay Mail Publication, 19o6)
.




from among the members of the majority party (in this case,
the Alliance) in the lower house, one could not legitimately
claim that the Chinese component (all MCA members) in this
body truly represented the interest of the entire Chinese
community. Therefore, a more realistic impression of Chi-
nese representation in Malaysian politics would exclude any
Chinese coalition with the Malay-dominated Alliance or Na-
tional Front (N?) which was formed in the early 1970* s and
included the Alliance participants. This categorical defi-
nition will be used throughout the thesis to reflect Chinese
representation in the Malaysian political scene. Conse-
quently, with the inclusion of this qualifying factor, actu-
al representation of the "ordinary" Chinese in the Cabinet
was nihil. The ordinary Chinese (shop-keepers, hawkers,
taxi drivers, mechanics) who compose the majority of the
Chinese community, are by no means politically, economically
or socially united themselves. Dr. Stephen Leong, a histo-
rian at the University of Malaya, made the following com-
ments concerning Chinese disunity:
The continued existence of multiple Chinese parties will
contribute to the disunity of the Chinese. This is be-
cause each party regards itself as the best representative
of the Chinese community and in making organised efforts
to win the support of the Chinese, they will split the
community (at least) three ways. 107
This disparate representational trend was also evident
in the Parliament. Table III shows that 33^ of the Senate
seats were held by ethnic Chinese. Table IV reflects a 29^
Chinese representation in the House of Representatives. By




WEST MALAYSIAN CHINESE REPRESENTATION
IN THE SENATE 19 65
Name Party
Ong Yoke Lin (Appointed) Alliance
Cheah Too Lok (Appointed) Alliance
Foo See Moi (Appointed) Alliance
Gan Teck Yeow (Appointed) Alliance
Khoo Teck Puat (Appointed) Alliance
Y« T. Lee (Appointed) Alliance
Li.m Hee Hong (Appointed) Alliance
William Tan (Appointed) Alliance
T. K. Tan (Appointed) Alliance
Chan Keong Kov. (Appointed) Alliance
Hong Kim Sui (Appointed) Alliance
Cheah Seng Khim (Penang) Alliance
Goh Chek Kin (Trengganu) Alliance
Hon Chee Che ong (Pahang) Alliance
Koh Kim Leng (Malacca) Alliance
Lee Pocng Yee (?fegeri Sembilan) Alliance
Lim Joo Kong (Kedah) Alliance
Yeah Kian Teik (Perak) Alliance
Percentage of Chinese members in the Senate = jy% (18 out of 54)
Percentage of elected Chinese members in the Senate = "}2% (7 out
Of 22)
Percentage of elected Chinese members in the Senate excluding
the Alliance Senators = Ofo (0 out of 22)
Remarks in parenthesis indicate the following: the state from
which the Senator was elected or that the Senator was appointed.

TABLE IV
WEST MALAYSIAN CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THI






























































































Percentage of Chinese members in the House of Representatives
29% (30 out of 104)
Percentage of Chinese members in the House of Representatives
excluding the Alliance Representatives = Jfo (3 out of 104)
ALL - Alliance
UDP - United Democratic Party
SF - Socialist Front
52

members of the Alliance and the MCA in particular, the fol-
lowing picture of actual Chinese representation in Parlia-
ment is depicted: 0% in the Senate and 3% in the lower
house. It should be noted that Chinese representation in
the Senate will, in all likelihood, remain nonexistent or
extremely low. This is due to the procedures for the selec-
tion of Senators; 32 are appointed by the Supreme Head of
State and the remainder, two from each of the 13 states,
are elected by the state assemblies which are controlled by
the Malays.
Table V reveals that Chinese political influence in the
state assemblies (11) of West Malaysia was also considerably
low in comparison to the proportion of the Chinese popula-
tion in the various states. In the final analysis, one can
categorically affirm that the Alliance and, specifically,
the Malays maintained an overwhelming stranglehold on the
political power in Peninsular Malaysia, from the federal to
the state levels, at the time of the separation of Singapore
from the federation (9 August 1965)
•
The post-separation road leading to the elections of
1969 was littered with obstacles which the Alliance and,
particularly, the MCA had to hurdle. The problem of lan-
guage and the related problem of education became controver-
sial issues and eventually exacerbated communal tensions in
the intervening years. The year 1967 marked the end of a
ten-year period during which English and Malay could be
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the official language of the federation. The 1967 National
Language Bill provided that other languages be used where
necessary as 'translations*, thus calming in part Chinese
and Indian opposition, and that English be used, with per-
mission of the head of state (Yang di-Pertuan Agong) , for
'such official purposes as may be deemed fit', which sounded
to many zealous Malays like condoning the official use of
108English indefinitely.
Under the British colonial reign, Chinese and Indian
language schools were allowed to flourish independent of fed-
eral and local government intervention or subsidy, until the
necessity arose to institute health inspections and politi-
cal controls. While the most prestigious English-language
instruction remained the domain of the missionaries and
other voluntary efforts, the British colonial authorities
advanced and subsidized Malay vernacular education. Under
these circumstances, the chances of fashioning a single na-
tional educational system was at best dismal, especially in
view of the fact that each ethnic group jealously guarded
its respective language and traditions. The Chinese viewed
Mandarin (dialect) language education as an essential link
with their ancestral heritage and the traditions of the home-
land. The Indian position basically mirrored that of the
Chinese.
The independent ?.talayan government's posture on this
problem was to subsidize even vernacular and English schools,
as well as Malay education. In addition, all schools were
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required to present a prescribed number of hours' instruc-
tion in Malay and, where necessary, in English. At the lev-
el of secondary education, the route narrowed; by 1967 no
pupils were in Indian (Tamil) language secondary schools,
some 22,221 attended Chinese middle schools, which were not
eligible for subsidy, 128,625 were in Malay-medium schools,
and 312,063 in English-language secondary schools. ° Al-
though the English language predominated at the University
of Malaya, English and Malay instruction were available at
the tertiary level. Tertiary education in Chinese was pri-
marily offered at Singapore's Nanyang University, a center
of controversy for much of this period because of its polit-
ical orientation and academic qualifications.
Chinese schools became a crucial, sensitive and volatile
issue for a series of reasons. The most obvious reason was
the perpetual link which they forged between the culture of
the immigrants and their homeland. In lesser Chinese commu-
nities, the schools and its officials were the centers of
community leadership, power and prestige. Furthermore,
recognition of Chinese -language schools was a basic issue
because anyone hoping for a better job on the basis of his
school certificate must first be guaranteed its accredita-
tion. Finally, Chinese schools represented a sensitive po-
litical issue which was only aggravated by the fears of
security officials that the schools might be centers for
Communist influence. After the failure of the violent
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tactics of the Emergency, the Malayan Communist Party turned
its attention, it has been asserted, to a non-violent strug-
110gle for influence in just those schools.
In addition to the fears and apprehensions pertaining to
the future existence of Chinese-language education, there
was a genuine concern for the prospect of English in the Ma-
laysian educational environment. Although English was held
in high esteem by members of all ethnic groups and remained
the dominant language of instruction at the secondary and
tertiary levels of education, it was too alien or, more pre-
cisely, "Western" to be an acceptable national language. An
irreversible course was then plotted for the abandonment of
English at all levels of education despite the expressed
doubts of skilled officials concerning the availability of
textbooks and qualified instructors at both the secondary
and university levels.
As the 1969 election campaign rolled around, the effects
of these issues were at the forefront and were to have ad-
verse repercussions on the Alliance and the MCA in particu-
lar. When the votes of the 10 May elections were tabulated,
the outcome was considered a severe reversal for "he Alli-
ance, an almost total rout for the MCA and a tremendous suc-
cess for the non-Malay opposition. Before Alliance forces
had recovered from the shock, jubilation and recriminations
touched off racial violence in Kuala Lumpur which soon
spread to other areas, lasting several days, and taking an
appalling toll in life and property. Xi -L The particulars of
this cataclysmic event is discussed in the next chapter.
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The spotlight of the 1969 General Elections was focused
on the contests for the seats in the House of Representa-
tives and the state assemblies. Chinese representation in
the lower house of Parliament increased dramatically from 2>%
to a high of 15% (Table VI). This increase, combined with
the gains of other opposition parties, prematurely and tem-
porarily threatened the attainment of a two-thirds majority
by the Alliance which is necessary to amend the Constitution.
The Alliance eventually gained the two-thirds majority with
the victories in the Hast Malaysian elections. Consequently,
despite the significant progress achieved by the opposition
Chinese, the Alliance and the Malays continued to dominate
the politics of Malaysia. Although the rise in Chinese rep-
resentation to 15% was indeed astounding, it still failed to
remotely approach the 2>5% Chinese population ratio in Penin-
sular Malaysia.
At the state level, five state assemblies—Malacca,
Negeri Sembilan, Penang, Perak, and Selangor—achieved sub-
stantial increases (15% or more) in Chinese representation
(Table VII). Table VII also reveals that Chinese represen-
tation in only one state, Penang, managed to approach and
even surpass the population ratio for that state. On the
other hand, Chinese representation in the state assemblies
of Kelantan, Perlis and Trengganu again failed to rise above
the zero percentage mark. Tables VIII and IX show the same
zero percentage figure for Chinese representation in the
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Percentage of Chinese members in the House of Representatives
28?S (29 out of 10*0
Percentage of Chinese members in the House of Representatives
excluding the Alliance Representatives = 1$% ( 16 out of 104)
ALL - Alliance
DAP - Democratic Action Party
GRM - Cerakan Ra'ayat Malaysia
ppp _ people's Progressive party
Tan Siew Sin Malacca
Chan ?u King Perak
Chan Siang Sun Pahang
Chan Yoon Onn Perak
Chen Man Hin Negeri Sembilan
Chu Chee Pang Johore
Fan Yew Teng Perak
Goh Heck Guan Selangor
Hon Check Poon Selangor
Khaw Kai-Boh Selangor
Lee Seek Fun Perak
Lee Si ok Yew Selangor
Lee Soon Seng or San Chocn Johore
Lim Cho Hock Perak
Lira Chong Eu Penang
Lim Kit Siang Malacca
Lim Pee Hung Kedah
Loh Jee Mee Perak
Ng Hoe Hun Trengganu
Richard Ho ling Hun Perak
Seah Teng Ngiap Johore
Soh Ah Teck Johore
Su Liang Yu Perak
Tai Kuan Yang Kedah
Tan Chee Khoon . Selangor
Tan Cheng Bee Penang
Tiah Eng Bee Johore
Walter Loh ?oh Khan Selangor
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1969 CABINET OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA
Prime Minister . , . . . Abdul Rahman
Deputy Prime Minister . . Abdul Razak
Minister of Foreign Affairs , Abdul Rahman
Minister of Defence , Abdul Razak
Minister of Home Affairs . . . Ismail bin Dato' Abdul Rahman
Minister of Justice .............. Ganie Gilong
Minister of Finance . . , , Abdul Razak (acting)
Minister of National & Rural Development .... Abdul Ghafar
bin Baba
Minister of Culture, Youth & Sports Abdul Rahman
Minister of Works, Posts & Telecommunications . VT Sambanthan
Minister of Transport .......... V. Manickavasingam (acting)
Minister of Education Abdul Rahman bin Ya'kub
Minister of Health Sardon bin Haji Jubir
Minister of Commerce & Industry .... Mohammed Khir Johari
Minister of Welfare Services . . . Fatimah binti Haji Hashim
Minister of local Government & Housing . Mohammed Khir Johari (acting)
Minister of Sarawak Affairs ,...,,. Jugah anak 3arieng
Minister of Labour ... V. Manickavasingam
Minister of Information & Broadcasting . . . Hamzah bin Dato
Abu Samah
Minister of Agriculture i Co-operatives . . Mohammed Ghazali
bin Ha.ji Jawi
Minister of Lands and Mines ...... Abdul Ghafar bin Baba
Minister for Special Duties .......... Tun Siew Sin **
Minister for Special Duties Khaw Kai-Boh **
Minister for Special Duties Lee Siok Yew **
Source: Malay Mail. Malaysia Year Boo:-:, -?6 Q (Kuala Lumpur j
Malay Mail Publication, 1 9 7 J
.
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Name
Cheah Toon Lok (Appointed)
Poo See Moi (Appointed)
Y. T. Lee (Appointed)
Hong Kim Sui (Appointed)
Lim Hee Hong (Appointed)
Gan Tec!-: Yeow (Appointed)
Ong Yoke Lim (Appointed)
T. H. Tan (Appointed)
William Tan (Appointed)
Chan Kv/ong Hon (Selangor)
Cheah Seng Khim (Penang)
Chong Foo Khin (Negeri Sembilan)
Ngau Ken Lock (Pahang)
















Percentage of Chinese members in the Senate = 26fS (iv out of 5*0
Percentage 01 elected Chinese members in the Senate = 23$ (5 out
of 22)
Percentage of elected Chinese members in the Senate excluding
the Alliance Senators = Q% (0 out of 22)
Remarks in parenthesis indicate the following: the state from
which the Senator was elected or that the Senator was aooointed,
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opposition Chinese and the ensuing communal violence, the Al-
liance and the Malays prevailed in the most tragic election
year of Malaysia's young history.
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IV. THE MAY THIRTEENTH INCIDENT
On May 13, 1969 racial rioting erupted in Kuala Lumpur
with a ferocity and attendant loss of life unparalleled in
112Malaysia's modern history. The events which ignited this
explosion were initiated 72 hours earlier as Malaysians pro-
ceeded to the polls in the nation's third general election
since independence. Commencing on 10 May, indications began
to surface which intimated that the dominant multi -ethnic
coalitioned Alliance Party—comprised of the United Malays
National Organization (UMNO), Malaysian Chinese Association
(MCA) and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) —had sustained
unforeseen reverses in the election. On 12 May, the two ma-
jor, urban-based opposition parties held "victory 1* marches
113in Kuala Lumpur. J Ecstatic with their success, members of
the procession shouted taunts which were calculated to evoke
apprehension in Malay bystanders of being pushed aside by
increasingly more active ethnic groups. The local UMNO hi-
erarchy responded with their own organized procession on the
evening of May 13. The residence of the Chief Minister of
Selangor in Kampong Bharu, a large Malay settlement in the
predominantly Chinese capital, was selected as the starting
point. 1 Tensions were high among the people milling about
and when the news reached them, about one hour before the
procession's scheduled beginning, "that Malay would-be par-
ticipants . . . had been attacked ... by Chinese groups
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• • • enroute to Kanrpong Bharu" it caused a "violent anti-
Chinese reaction" and several deaths. ^ The rapidity and
magnitude of the ensuing violence completely surprised the
security forces and several days were required to reestab-
lish control.
To understand the development of this, the blackest
event in Malaysian history, certain problematic factors in-
volving the ruling incumbent party, the Alliance, require
examination. The problem areas for the Alliance were fos-
tered in the tough campaign of the Pan Malayan Islamic Party
(PMIP) among the Malays, indisputable heightening of commu-
nal tensions, and troubles in the East Malaysian states of
Sabah and Sarawak. However, on the Leftist front, the sit-
uation seemed secure since the parties of the liberal Left
remained divided as in past elections. The founding of
Gerakan Ra'ayat Malaysia (Malaysian People's Movement), a
middle-of-the-road party established in 1968 by former La-
bour Party of Malaysia (LPM) and United Democratic Party
(HDP) politicians with the support of the several leading
intellectuals, was not the glue for greater cohesiveness but
a potential catalyst for intensified friction, bitterness
and disunity. Almost total confusion gripped the ranks of
the Left as the LPM and the Partai Ra'ayat (People's Party),
an agrarian socialist party which failed to rally Malay
peasant support, were unsuccessful in reconstructing the
Socialist Front (SF). In Perak, the People's Progressive
^5

Party (PPP) and Democratic Action Party (DAP) had arrived at
an electoral agreement but the concept of complete unity or
even a coalition appeared to be out-of-the-question.
As the realities of the above-mentioned circumstances
pervaded, December 1968 saw the catalytic events which were
to change the outlook of the Left. On 3 December 1968, the
Labour Party operationalized a strategy which specifically
exhorted its supporters and anyone else to boycott the elec-
tions. No one was surprised at this for the party was in
poor shape to fight an election, and, indeed, later evidence
was to suggest that it had abandoned the parliamentary road
to power over a year before. What precipitated the im-
plementation of this tactic was the in carceration (9 Novem-
ber 1968) of prominent Labour Party members as a result of
an attack on Malaysian security forces along the Thai-Malay
border. These individuals were accused of conspiring with
the illegal Malayan Communist Party. The Labour Party as-
serted that such repressive measures created an environment
in which it could not function. In addition to invoking the
boycott, the Labour Party responded by ordering the resigna-
tion of its representatives in the Dewan Ra'ayat (Parliament)
and the State Assemblies. In thousands of leaflets distrib-
uted throughout the country, it argued that the November ar-
rests had been carried out, to "make it easier for the
Alliance to win the polls" and continued: "The recent mass
resignation by the Labour Party members is to protest
117
against the death of democracy." ' The terms which the
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Labour Party had delineated for the termination of the boy-
cott such as the repeal of the Internal Security Act, the
release of detainees, free elections conducted under specif-
ic guidelines, etc., were so unrealistic that the Labour
Party's decision not to participate in the election was a
"fait accompli." Since only an insignificant number were
expected to honor the boycott and abstain from voting, there
were approximately 250,000 votes "up-for-grabs" among the
remaining left-oriented parties.
The other event which assisted in distorting the picture
was the somewhat unforeseen Alliance victory (28 December
1968) in the Selangor State by-election at Serdang, a seat
held by the incumbent Partai Ra'ayat. Since DAP and Gerakan
split their votes (each entered a candidate), the Alliance
was allowed to slip in and capture the seat with a very
small majority (only 60? votes). The margin of victory
prompted allegations that Gerakan gave the election to the
Alliance. The lessons-learned dictated that an electoral
pact or coalition was forthcoming and, only two days later,
DAP called for such an arrangement. Although Gerakan was
apprehensive, a detailed electoral pact between DAP and the
latter was cemented and declared on 21 February 1969. Some
remarks by Goh Hock Guan (DAP Secretary-General) at the
press conference announcing it showed how important he
thought Serdang had been: "The experience we have got from
this election has been bitter enough and I believe we will
never again fight among ourselves and allow the Alliance to
118
sit on our corpses."
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The Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) , an element of
the Alliance, was most distressed about this union. Tan
Siew Sin, a leading MCA party official, referred to this ar-
rangement as "a mere marriage of convenience." But he then
revealed his real fears when he declared:
If the opposition manages to wrest key seats from the MCA,
it will mean that the country will he ruled by an Alliance
Government without Chinese participation. It would mean
in effect a confrontation between a Government without
participation and a practically all -Chinese opposition. 119
A result of that extent would spark cataclysmic effects
on communal relations. Lee Kuan Yew's concept of Malaysian
Malaysia (in contrast to a Malay Malaysia) seemed to have
brought communal differences into the open more clearly than
ever, and as a result the MCA had been under pressure from
120those who accused it of selling out to the Malays. As
the UMNO assisted the MCA in fulfilling the majority of its
views (except those of the ultra-radicals) throughout the
1965-67 period, they became threatened by the FMIF in the
northern four states. With the assistance of Malay language
teachers and Muslim Ulamas (jurists), the FMIP solicited the
support of the Malay rural electorate and definitely made
headway. The announcement in September 19c8 by Mohammed
Khir Johari that a National University was to be established
which would include the Islamic College at Fetaling Jaya and
use the national language as the medium of instruction, was
but one attempt on the part of the Government to show that
it cared for Malays, the Malay language and Islam as much as
FMIP. The primary participants in the Alliance found
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themselves in positions where their flanks were exposed to
the threats of communal parties. In the process of deflec-
ting these threats, the inevitability of communal factional-
ism which festers throughout the Malaysian society, rose to
the forefront and adversely affected the internal function-
ing of the Alliance,
A. THE CAMPAIGN
The prelude which played a significant catalytic role in
the May Thirteenth Incident, was the campaign prior to the
election. The Alliance, the only party which had won a na-
tional election and could win the 1969 election, asked to be
evaluated on its past performance and promised in convincing
terms what it would accomplish on a national scale in the
future. The opposition parties could win certain state gov-
ernments but no single opposition party entered a sufficient
number of candidates to gain the necessary 73 seats in the
House of Representatives to control the Central Government.
Consequently, the Alliance relied upon and placed pri-
mary emphasis on its achievements in twelve years of indepen-
dence. Statistical comparisons were offered to illustrate
increases in schools, telephones, post offices, villages
122
with electricity, miles of roads, etc., since 1957. Fi-
nance Minister Tun Tan Siew Sin claimed that the Alliance
had accomplished more in twelve years than the British had
in 200 years. J He also proclaimed on several occasions
that the Alliance was responsible for the establishment of
a very large new middle class and the elimination of the
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really poor, according to Asian standards. The Alliance al-
so cautioned the electorate of the consequencies if they
were not reelected
—
prosperity, stability, racial harmony,
and even democracy itself would undoubtedly perish. The Al-
liance proclaimed themselves as being the only party that
was competent to operate the government, was genuinely Ma-
laysian, and was uninhibited by foreign influence and pres-
sure. Some members of the Alliance leadership considered a
plain majority as being totally unacceptable. Mohammed Khir
Johari, Director of Election Operations, reminded the people
that without a two-thirds majority the Alliance could not
have introduced the Emergency Laws which included preventive
detention without trial. Without these measures, he
maintained, Communism could have triumphed in Malaysia de-
spite an Alliance government: a two-thirds majority was es-
sential for continued security. 3
The PMIP strategy focused its efforts on retaining con-
trol of the state government of Kelantan while major re-
sources were expended to contest the incumbencies in Kedah,
Perlis, Perak, and Trengganu. Examples of PMIP campaign
tactics
:
As the professed champion of the Malays, PMIP attacked,
not merely the Chinese and other infidel capitalists, but
the Malay rulers and the Establishment generally and de-
manded a republic. Exploiting the fears, prejudices, and
ignorance of the poorer Malays, it solemnly warned them
that the choice they had to make was one of 'God or the
Tunku. '126
Although the essence of the Gerakan and DAP campaigns
were similar, their platforms were not identical. 3oth
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parties demanded equality of treatment for all Malaysians
and expounded quite frequently about the ideals of democracy.
Differences, however, existed on the language issue where
the DAP strongly called for the official recognition of Chi-
nese, Tamil and English. Gerakan did not maintain such an
extreme position
—
probably due to their dependency on the
Malay vote. However, in the field of education they were in
agreement, with DA? demanding the reinstatement of Chinese
and Tamil secondary schools, while Lim Chong Eu, Deputy
Chairman of Gerakan, stressed that his party favored "the
concept of parallel development of the different language
127
media of instruction." DAP's stance on the language
question was more aligned with that of the FPP, champion of
the cause for Chinese education whose sphere of influence
was seated in Perak state. In Penang, PPP had declined an
electoral coalition with Gerakan over this issue but this
refusal was considered of no great consequence since the PPP
did not possess significant voter support outside of Perak.
This political maneuvering was purely academic because nei-
ther Gerakan nor DAP could be victorious in the national
election, nor could a coalition government be formed. Both
parties candidly admitted to this fact. However, Gerakan
did aspire to win the state government of Penang. Lim Chong
Eu claimed that in the 2^ state constituencies his party had
"ten very good chances and six fighting chances." Gera-
kan also threatened five of the eight parliamentary seats in
Penang and was aggressive in Selangor. Consequently,
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Gerakan concentrated its main assault in Selangor, Johore,
Negeri Serabilan, and Perak although the latter was conceded
to the DAP which possessed more candidates than Gerakan in
that state.
Partai Ra'ayat did not significantly influence the out-
come of the election. It challenged a few seats in Malacca,
Pahang and Perlis and was one of two parties (the other
being the PMIP) to favor the creation of a republic. Its
platform was analogous to the shot pattern of a shotgun
blast in that a scattered assortment of unrelated issues
which did not constitute any semblance of a policy, were ac-
centuated to attract various sections of the electorate.
For example, its demand for support for the Arabs against
Israel sought to divert Muslim support from PMIP and UMNO;
the call for the end of emergency law restrictions on trade
unions and support for the Vietcong were clearly designed to
attract the Left; the campaigns against foreign economic
domination and the British Defense Agreement and for the re-
introduction of local elections were also intended to at-
1 29
tract different groups of people."
Since the Labour Party boycotted the elections, it de-
cided to direct its resources and energy in a negative man-
ner. A publicity campaign was launched with the objective
of convincing the electorate not to vote. The Alliance re-
sponded by declaring that the Labour Party's campaign was
unconstitutional since the essence of the endeavor was aimed
at the subversion of the established electoral process.
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However, banners and posters could be legally displayed pro-
vided that permission was obtained. This consent was obvi-
ously not granted to the Labour Party. The campaign
continued and ensuing attempts to halt Labour's anti-election
operation erupted in unpleasant incidents of violence and
even death. The implications of the boycott presented diffi-
culties for certain Gerakan candidates whose previous affili-
ation (membership) with the Labour Party was the crux of the
problem. Dr. Tan Chee Khoon, a former Labour Party member,
was labeled a traitor by his old party when he ran in the
same constituency as a Gerakan candidate. Despite the Labour
Party's urgings for its supporters to abstain from voting,
the campaign was unsuccessful as Dr. Tan prevailed with the
second largest majority in the election.
To the non-Malaysian observer one of the most interest-
ing aspects of the campaign was the extent to which it was
dominated by mutual allegations of communalism, anti-Malay-
sianism and alien influence and subsidization. ^ No party
was exempted from these accusations and no party was beyond
utilizing this kind of maligning tactics against opposition
parties. This "smear campaign" was designed to turn as many
sectors of the population as possible against a certain par-
ty. Therefore, it was not enough for the Alliance to just
malign the PMIP as being anti-Chinese because to do so may
push some Malays into supporting the PMIP. To take this
"defamation" operation one step further, the Alliance then
made a concerted effort to convince the Malays that the PMIP
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was actually Communist and therefore aspired to create a
Communist government with the assistance of Peking and Com-
munist personnel from Thailand. In addition, frequently re-
iterated allegations charged that the PMIP had formulated
an electoral agreement with DAP, had collaborated with Gera-
kan in Penang and Perak, and had accepted funds from Singa-
pore. The Alliance added for good measure that the PMIP was
receiving financial support from certain "Middle East"
131
states. J
The DAP was not immune to the anti -Malay and Singapore
-
controlled puppet (because it had been a party based in
Singapore initially) charges of the Alliance. Fan Yew Teng,
a DAP candidate, ridiculed this argument, pointing out that
"the Indian Congress Party was founded by an Englishman but
this does not mean that Mrs. Gandhi owes allegiance to
132Harold Wilson." The Alliance compounded the allegations
by accusing the DAP of incorporating an anti -worker and
anti-Trade Union position predicated on the actions of its
"foreign masters." DAP Secretary-General Goh Hock Guan re-
acted to these taunts and retaliated by verbally denouncing
the Alliance as being anti -Malay.
Accusations of foreign entanglement were widespread and
rampant but the specifics normally remained unknown and neb-
ulous. On occasion individual names were revealed. The
leadership of the DAP brought up the case of Wu Ling Yu, a
Hong Kong-bred British national whom, they charged, had been
imported into Malaysia by the Alliance for the express pur-
pose of orchestrating the MCA campaign strategy. This case

was publicized in answer to the deportation of several DAP-
linked Singapore citizens on the pretext of "interfering" in
Malaysian politics. Tan Siew Sin (Minister of Commerce) de-
nied that Wu was employed in the capacity suggested, but was
rather an "expert on Communism" who was employed by MCA "on
specialized research" to "study Communist moves in Malaysia
and to counteract them." JJ
Implications of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in-
volvement were also brought out during the campaign. A Par-
tai Rakyat candidate in Malacca claimed that two Alliance
Cabinet Ministers had been in the pay of CIA."^ Dr. Tan
Chee Khoon alluded to the fact that the renomination of one
retiring MCA MP (Minister of Parliament) had been rejected
by the party because he was a CIA agent and further claimed
that Tan Siew Sin had knowledge of the individual's identity.
Ministers denied this, of course, but suspicions were aroused
1 3<further when the U.S. Embassy also issued a denial. JJ
One unusual development relating to illegal foreign con-
tributions involved the Prime Minister of Malaysia and the
PMIP Mentri 3esar (Chief Minister) of Kelantan, Dato Mohammed
Asri. These two government officials declared that their re-
spective parties had never accepted contributions of foreign
origin and indicated that they were prepared to reinforce
their declarations by voluntarily swearing solemn oaths on
the Holy Koran. Although these two pillars of Islam were
then informed that an oath on the Koran was contrary to Mus-
lim Law, they nevertheless did each swear an oath in separate
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mosques on 8 May. "^ In April, Abdul Razak and Tan Siew Sin
had both admitted that the parties of the Alliance had re-
ceived funds from locally based foreign firms, but only "on
a voluntary basis, with no strings": none of the money ac-
tually came from abroad, they declared. -*' Related to this
question of party funds was the persistent charges that the
Alliance manipulated government capital, assets and person-
nel for the advancement of their election aims. This situa-
tion had progressed to such a state that official information
could not be deciphered from election propaganda. Similarly,
charges were frequently made that civil servants were being
employed for party purposes, J and this no doubt extended
to include the police and information services.
But the "blackest" and most serious page in the campaign
accounts was the resort by ministers to "political blackmail"
and "bribery" tactics. There is no need to quote opposition
statements to prove this charge since Alliance leaders made
139
no attempt to disguise their meaning. -" On repeated occa-
sions, Alliance leaders overtly pressured the people through
warnings which threatened the cutoff of present and future
subsidies from the Central Government for economic develop-
ment projects if opposition governments were elected. Obvi-
ously, the reverse was true for Alliance -controlled state
governments. For example, Penang was the most lucrative
target for the opposition to unseat the Alliance. Gerakan's
promises revolved around economic progress especially the
construction of a bridge to the mainland. The Alliance
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responded with a tough position which jeopardized the hope
for such a project if an Alliance state government was not
elected. One final aspect of "economic development fund"
irregularities was the maladministration by the Alliance of
foreign aid which, in part, constitutes the appropriations
for the national economic development program.
B. THE ELECTION
West Malaysia went to the polls on 10 May 1969 and it
was not until the returns began filtering in that the quiet,
calm confidence of the UMNO constituency in the electoral
process became riddled with uncertainty. The elections in
East Malaysia were programmed for the period 10-25 May in
Sabah and 10 May to 7 June in Sarawak but the electoral pro-
cess was postponed because of the violence which erupted in
West Malaysia on 13 May. Election day in West Malaysia was
relatively tranquil with the exception of a few minor con-
frontations reported. The voter turnout, however, was 6,1%
lower (Table X) than the 1964 election. This could be ex-
plained by the fact that in 1964 the very concept of Malay-
sia was under question and its survival as a state threatened,
whereas no such issue stirred the electorate in 1969 f but
another factor could have been the Labour Party's call for a
boycott. In any case, the evidence was speculative and
not conclusive.
In the Parliamentary elections, the Alliance gained 66
seats (Table XI), and combined with the ten candidates run-
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1W--member Dewan Ra'ayat. Whether a two -thirds majority
would be eventually achieved rested on the outcome of the
elections in Hast Malaysia. But this question was not imme-
diately answered, again because of the suspension of the
elections.
The Alliance was understandably astonished by its sub-
standard performance—suffering a decrease of 2% of its
seats. Although the UMNO lost seven seats and the MIC one,
the MCA pillar collapsed unexpectedly. Its candidates were
defeated in Penang, Perak, Selangor, and Negeri Sembilan.
The aftermath vividly revealed that the MCA had retained
only 13 seats as compared to 27 in the 1964 contest. This
trend was also mirrored in the State Assembly elections. In
spite of the losses in Perlis, Trengganu and Kedah to the
PMIP, the most significant setbacks were registered in the
west coast states which were defended by the MCA. Tan Siew
Sin announced on 13 May, 1969 that his party would not par-
ticipate in an Alliance government since the election had
shown that the MCA had lost the confidence of the Chinese
community. The single most important variable which pre-
cipitated this adverse shift in voter confidence and eventu-
ally led to the defeat of the MCA candidates, was the fact
that in most constituencies they confronted a single adver-
sary of the Left because of the electoral pacts and the
withdrawl of the Labour Party. The MCA was, then, victim-
ized by a combination of a swing towards the Malay and Chi-






The mass amok which took place in Kuala Lumpur on 13 May
had its origins in the perceived change in the ethnic con-
figuration of power and the resultant sense of anxiety and
alarm. ^ The outcome of the election appeared to have been
an excuse or opportunity for the riots rather than the actu-
al cause of them. An important feature of note was the fact
that in the initial stages the violence was predominantly
confined to Kuala Lumpur. Parts of that city, such as Kam-
pong Bharu, were thickly populated by Malays who recently
migrated from the countryside, often from villages in other
states, and who lived in poor conditions. A significant
number of these rural immigrants were unemployed and were
able to observe in Kuala Lumpur the stark contrast between
their poverty or misfortune and the wealth of some Chinese
—
a source of communal division and rising expectations.
These poverty-stricken people resided in isolated ghettos
apart from the rest of the city under circumstances reminis-
cent of the village and retained the values of the kampong.
Given such circumstances and the flamboyant victory parade
of the (Chinese) Left on 12 May, it needed only some irre-
1^5
sponsible oratory to inflame Malay passions. J This v/as
furnished by UMNO leaders at a party assembly on the evening
of 13 May.
The time and location of the first lethal blows were
neither accidents nor coincidents. The Selangor results
(political stalemate) brought emotions of anger, frustration
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and apprehension to the surface within the ranks of the res-
ident UMNO organization. The catalyst that exacerbated
these emotions and sent the temperature to the boiling point
was the way in which DAP and Gerakan supporters in Kuala
Lumpur behaved on Sunday and Monday (11 and 12 May). Re-
alizing that the UMNO branch in Selangor was in a precarious
situation, bands of youthful sympathizers from the DAP and
Gerakan headed towards Dato Harun's (Chief Minister of Se-
langor) house in Jalan Raya Muda and rudely invited him to
quit this state residence since he was allegedly no longer
1^-7
Menteri 3esar. During the processions which were conduc-
ted to celebrate the Opposition's triumphs, youthful Chinese
and Indian constituents hurled insults and abuses at UMNO
supporters and Malays they encountered or at Malay resi-
dences they proceeded by. The slogans which were vocifer-
ated (substantiated by Malay eyewitnesses) indicated that
the Opposition considered the political standoff in Selangor
as a direct defeat for the ruling Malay political party and
an indirect defeat for the Malay people. Some of these
were: "Kapal layar bochor!" (?he sailing boat is leaking!);
"Melayu sudah jota'hl" (Malays have fallen!); "Melayu seka-
rang ta'ada kuasa lagii" (Malays now no longer have power!);
"Kuala Lumpur sekarang China punya!" (Kuala Lumpur now be-
longs to the Chinese!); Melayu boleh baleh kampong!" (Malays
1^-8
may return to their villages!).
The visit to the quarters of Dato Harun and the slogans
evoked vigorous reactions among Malay residents in the Great-
er Kuala Lumpur district especially Dato Harun's supporters,
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and led to an overflow of racial emotions. The most aroused
reactionaries were the young Kampong Bharu UMNO campaign
workers who bitterly resented the behavior of the Opposition
Chinese and Indian youths. In a countermove, they urged
Ahmad Razali, the Political Secretary to Dato Harun, to ob-
tain permission for them to hold an UMNO procession in order
to show to the Opposition parties that "UMNO, too, had a
good reason to celebrate as they were not defeated in the
State elections." ' UMNO party consent was given and a po-
lice permit granted. Ahmad said he spent four hours on the
night of 12 May visiting seven Malay-inhabited villages in
the Greater Kuala Lumpur district, namely, Kampong Dato
Keramat, Gombak (8i Milestone), Kampong Petaling, Kawasan
Melayu, Kampong Haji Abdullah Hukom, Kampong Pandan Dalam
and Kampong Jaya, in order to contact UMNO leaders and mobi-
lize support for the counter-demonstration scheduled to
start from Dato Harun' s house the next day at 7.30 p.m. ->
Official government reports did not reveal the exact time
when the crowd began to build but police estimates of the
gathering ranged from between ^,000 to 5»000 people. Some
of the would-be demonstrators carried sticks and banners and
"a few were seen to be armed with parangs and kris(es)."
At about this moment, another police officer commanding a
field force testified that "... a Malay youth, riding a
scooter, heading towards the Menteri Besar's residence
shouted 'Setapak sudah kena langgar' (Setapak has been at-
1 ^2tacked)." Mass violence subsequently erupted and Dato
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Harun's appeals for calm among his supporters fell on deaf
ears. The first killings and burnings were said to have
"been carried out by young Malays from this meeting in the
Chinese section in Kampong Bharu. JJ The casualty figures
and the flooding of the refugee centers by predominantly
Chinese and Indian elements were definite indications of who
maintained the initiative. During this period of unrest
there were widespread reports of great leniency exhibited by
the army towards the Malay rioters.
The explosion of inter-communal violence in Kuala Lumpur
on 13 May precipitated the declaration of a state of emer-
gency which led to the suspension of parliamentary democracy
and the banning of party politics. The elections in Sarawak
and Sabah were subsequently suspended. An eight-man "Na-
tional Operations Council" (NCC) under the direction of Tun
Razak was formed to co-ordinate the work of the army and po-
lice in the restoration of law and order, and not to super-
sede the Cabinet."" The NOC reported the following results
s
Official data on the May 13 disturbances reported 196 per-
sons died and ^39 were injured. Of those who died, 25
were Malays and 1^3 were Chinese. More than 9,000 persons
were arrested between May 13 and July 31. The majority
were Chinese. -55 (See Table XII)
John Slimming estimated the death toll at 800, while the
homeless refugees who fled the area reached more than 6,000
after the initial five days.
The May Thirteenth Incident is just another example of
the racial conflict between the Chinese and Malays which
permeates all facets (economic, political and social) of Ma-
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confined to ethnic differences but, more recently, it has
pitted an economically-dominant Chinese community with as-
pirations of political and social equality against a politi-
cally-dominant Malay community with desires for economic
power. The realities of the May Thirteenth Incident are not
unique to Malaysia but prevalent in almost every nation in
Southeast Asia. The common denominator in each case is an
overseas Chinese community which normally controls the eco-
nomic well-being of that particular country.
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V, THS 197^ AND 1978 GENERAL ELECTIONS
The period between the General Elections of 1969 and
197^ saw the stabilization of the internal unrest caused by
the May 13 incident in Malaysia. This four-year period also
witnessed three significant regional developments which in-
directly provided stability in Malaysia and strengthened the
Alliance political stock for the 197^ General Elections.
First, the scale down of the Vietnam War and the accelerated
extrication of United States forces from the conflict were
major steps in reducing hostilities in the region. The re-
duction of U.S. military involvement failed to deter the
flow of American business investments into the region (in-
cluding Malaysia) —more regional offices, joint enterprises,
wholly-owned subsidiaries, and factories surfaced. Second,
President Richard Nixon's historic trip to the People's Re-
public of China (PRC) in February 1972 (followed by the es-
tablishment of diplomatic relations between Malaysia and the
PRC) was a dramatic event for both nations as well as the
entire region. This milestone undoubtedly led to better
relations between the Malaysian government and the Malaysian
Chinese. Finally, the increasing importance of the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which advocated the
neutralization of the region, lessened the tensions between
Malaysia and her' immediate neighbors. These developments
37

impacted quite favorably upon Malaysia and the Alliance (es-
pecially in the 1974 General Elections) as the stability of
the country was significantly enhanced.
Within Malaysia itself the following events occurred
which set the scene for the elections of 197^: the long-
awaited resignation in September 1970 of the prime minister-
ship by Tengku Abdul Rahman in favor of Tun Abdul Razak who
subsequently demonstrated sound administrative talents and
wide-ranging qualities of leadership; a change in the ruling
coalition, the Alliance, with the supplementation of former
opposition parties to form a wider and looser coalition, the
National Front; a steady increase in the economic perfor-
mance of the country since 1969; an absence of racial vio-
lence during the intervening years; and the implementation
of federal budgets designed to increase government spending,
counter recession and minimize the impact of inflation.
A. THE 197^ GENERAL ELECTIONS
The post-mortem of the 197^ General Elections in Malay-
sia revealed that the Barisan Nasional (3N) or National
Front (NF), a coalition of nine political parties from Pen-
insular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak, had achieved a surpris-
ingly easy and complete victory. The NF included the United
Malays National Organization (UMNO), the Malaysian Chinese
Association (MCA), the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC)—all
part of the Alliance, Peninsular Malaysia—together with the
Partai Islam (PAS), the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan),
the People's Progressive Party (PPP), the Sabah Alliance,
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the Sarawak Alliance, and the Sarawak United People's Party
(SUPP). In executing this sweeping triumph, the NF captured
104 of the 114 Parliamentary seats (91#) in West Malaysia.
This means that the NF was much stronger in 1974 at the
"Federal level than the Alliance was in 1959, at the begin-
ning of the First Malayan Parliament, or in 1964, at the be-
ginning of the First Malaysian Parliament, or in 1969, at
the beginning of the Second Malaysian Parliament." *'
The tremendous triumph of the NF becomes increasingly
devastating if one reviews the election results in the vari-
ous states. For the first time since 1959, the coalition in
control of the Federal Government was also in charge of each
and every state in the Federation."^ To add to the over-
kill, the NF also seized three state assemblies—Kelantan,
Pahang and Perlis—without conceding a single seat to the
opposition Chinese. The opposition Chinese in the remaining
state assemblies especially in Peninsular Malaysia, could
not muster sufficient seats to politically influence the af-
fairs in their respective states.
While the NF's victory was overwhelming, the reverse
was true for the opposition Chinese. Chinese membership in
the Cabinet consisted of four ministers, constituting only
17% of that body, but all were members of the NF (Table XIII)
Chinese representation in the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives were also low, Of* and Qfo, respectively (Tables
XIV -XV). In five state assemblies—Kedah, Kelantan, Pahang,




197^ CABINET OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA
Prime Minister Abdul Razak
Deputy Prime Minister Hussein Onn
Minister of Foreign Affairs . Abdul Razak
Minister of Defence Abdul Razak
Minister of Home Affairs .... Muhammad Ghazali 3 in Shafie
Minister of Finance Hussein Onn
Minister of Culture, Youth & Sports . . . Ali Bin Haji Ahmad
Minister of Transport & Works .... Abdul Ghani Bin Oilong
Minister of Education Mahathir 3in Mohammad
Minister of Health Lee Siok Yew **
Minister of Trade & Industry , . . Hamzah Bin Haji Abu Samah
Minisxer of v/elfare Services .... Aishah binte Abdul Ghani
Minister of Local Government & Environment . . . Cng Kee Hui **
Minister of Labour & Manpower .... Lee San Choon **
Minister of Information & Special Functions . Ahmad Rithaudeen
Al-Hai Bin Tengku Ismail
Minister of Agriculture & Development . Abdul Ghafar Bin Baba
Minister of Lands and Mines . . . Mohammed Asri Bin Haji Muda
Minister of Communications . . V. Manickavasagam
Minister of Lav/ and Attorney-General , . . Abdul Kadir Yusof
Minister of General Planning & Socio- Abdul Teib Bin Mahmud
Economic Research
Minister of Power, Technology & Research , Mohammed Bin Yaacob
Minister of Housing & New Villages . . Michael Chen Wing Sum **
Minister of Primary Industries Musa Hitam
Minister without Portfolio ....... Mohammed Khir Johari
Source i Malay Mail. Official Malay-.: a Year "'cole, V>">h (Kuala
Lumpur: Malay Mail Publication, 19731 •





WEST MALAYSIAN CHINESE REPRESENTATION
IN THE SENATE 197^
Name
Ong Yoke Lin (Appointed)
Gan Teck Yecw (Appointed)
Kara V/con 'Van (Appointed)
Law Hiang Ding (ADpointed)
Lira Keng Yaik (Appointed)
Seah Teng Ngaib (Appointed)
V/ee Khoon Hock (Appointed)
Chan Kwong Hon (Selangor)
Ghong ?oo Khin (Negeri ' embilan
Chua Ching Cheng (Malacca)
Lee Loy Seng (Perak)
Lim Ah Sitt (Johore)
Ngau Ken Lock (Pahang)
Oh 3iow Aun (Perak)

















Percentage of Chinese -embers in the Senate - 2~;' (15 out of $b)
Percentage of elected Chinese members in the Senate = 36?? (8 out
of 22)
Percentage of elected Chinese members in the Senate excluding
the National Front (NF) Senators = W, (0 out of 22)
"Remarks in parenthesis indicate the following: the state from
which the Senator '.vis elected or that the Senator was appointed.
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Percentage of Chinese members in the House of Rerresenta tives
263 (30 out of 114)
Forcer, ta~e of Chinese members in the House of Representatives
excluding the National Front (NF) Renrescntati ves = f ^ (9 out
of 114)
*NF - National Front and DAP - Democratic Action Party
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blank, failing to seat a single member (Table XVI). In the
remainder of the state assemblies, the verdict was not en-
couraging as Chinese representation did not remotely ap-
proach the Chinese population percentages for these states
(Table XVI)
.
What factors could explain the NF's sweeping success?
First, there was the NF itself which expanded its voter ap-
peal by incorporating six additional political parties into
their coalition. In view of this expanded coalition, the
voting alternatives for those Chinese who could vote were
somewhat limited to casting their ballots for the NF's Chi-
nese candidates, sticking with the opposition Chinese can-
didates whose chances of winning were at best minimal, or
abstaining. Tun Razak's (Prime Minister) oft-repeated warn-
ing to the community (Chinese) that failure to elect the
3N's Chinese candidates would result in an all-Malay govern-
ment must have convinced a lot of Chinese voters about the
1 ^9danger of rejecting the coalition. J7 In Tun Razak's words:
They (the Chinese and Indians) must vote non-Malay candi-
dates from the National Front, otherwise, they will have
no representatives in the government which will be estab-
lished. . . Even without non-Malay candidates from the
3arisan Masional we can establish a government. 1«0
It is significant that Datuk Lee 3an Choon, the Acting MCA
President, responded to the warning by urging the Chinese to
"vote Chinese who can play a role in government." It may
have been with this purpose in mind that the Chinese backed
the MCA, the only Chinese -based party in the NF with a long
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addition to this expanded organization, the men, money and
machinery at the NF's disposal undoubtedly played an impor-
tant role in the annihilation of the opposition.
A second factor, intangible but no less significant, was
the specter and intimidation of the 13 May 1969 communal
riots between Malays and Chinese which hung over the elec-
tion. The Razak Government took stringent precautions to
dampen emotions and prevent another outbreak of violence.
Public discussions of controversial racial issues were pro-
hibited, as were post-election parades and demonstrations.
No rallies were permitted on 23 August 197^, the last day of
campaigning, on the pretext that breathing space was neces-
sary to allow for the deployment of 6,000 policemen.
There was no violence and no overt tension—although the
turnout was down somewhat from 1969 » suggesting that some
people's old fears kept them from the polls. ^ Official
figures showed that 6ty*> of the four million eligible voters
voted in what was the fourth general election since this
tropical Southeast Asian nation gained independence from
Britain in 1957.
Other factors which played major roles included the Gov-
ernment's electoral gerrymandering and blackmailing tactics.
The Government, talcing advantage of a constitutional require-
ment to redraw district lines every 10 years, gerrymandered
districts blatantly to make things as bleak as possible for
the opposition. 1 ^ v^is tactic was so blatant that not even
lip service appeared to be paid to the principle of one man,
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one vote. The election results substantiate the successful
application of the gerrymandering technique. Although the
Government won nearly 90 percent of the parliamentary seats,
it got only about 60 percent of the vote. 1 On the other
hand, the Chinese-based Democratic Action Party (DAP) cap-
tured 20fo of the popular vote, much more than in the last
election, but only managed to maintain its nine-seat bloc in
the Parliament. The Prime Minister, in another blunt move,
warned voters in what some described as electorate blackmail
—that if they elected opposition governments in any of the
states, then the central government would cut off all funds
168
1 A7
to those states. "Vote for a strong government or suf-
fer," he said.
The NF's overwhelming victory in the elections did not
remove racialism from Malaysia* s political life but may, in
fact, have exaggerated the problem. In the process of se-
curing power for the Malay-dominated Government for the next
five years, this strong victory virtually wiped out all the
169
moderate and nonracial opposition parties. ' What remained
was a militant, racially-oriented Chinese party (DAP) as the
only alternative to the Government. Long-time political ob-
servers felt that its (DAP) emergence as the only viable op-
position could polarize politics racially and exaggerate
ethnic differences in this delicately balanced country of
170
Malays, Chinese and Indians.
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B. THE 1978 GENERAL ELECTIONS T
As expected, the 1978 Malaysian General Elections almost
resembled an "instant replay" of the last one (1974). It
was not so much a landslide as a lava flow, with the over-
whelming majority for the ruling Barisan Nasional (National
Front) of Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn slowly becoming
evident on the morning of Sunday, July 9, but without any of
the drama and trauma of great victories or crushing defeats. ^
The NF, now a ten-party coalition, captured 94 of the 114
(82.5$) parliamentary seats in Peninsular Malaysia. As usu-
al, Chinese representation failed to materialize in the Cab-
inet and Senate (Tables XVII -XVIII). Although Chinese
representation in the House of Representatives rose one per-
centage point to the ten percentage point mark, this figure
was inconsequential in regards to political power and influ-
ence in the Parliament (Table XIX). At the state assembly
level, Chinese representation remained dismal as the voting
outcome mirrored those of the 1974 State Legislative Assem-
bly Elections (Table XX).
It would have been a superb victory, but for the shadows
172
of racial polarisation that fell across the voters* verdict.
Despite the general atmosphere of peace, there was little,
if any, doubt that the myth of inter-racial cooperation was
critically questioned by the results. The opposition scored
gains that appeared to reflect the Chinese community's un-




1978 CABINET 0? THE FEDERATION OF MALAYSIA
Prime Minister ......... ... Hussein Onn
Deputy Prime Minister ... Mahathir Bin Mohamad
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmad Rithaudeen Alhaj
Bin Tengku Ismail
Minister of Defence Amar Haii Abdul Taib Mahmud
Minister of Home Affairs .... Muhammad Ghazali Bin Shafie
Minister of Finance ............ Razaleigh Hamzah
Minister of Culture, Youth & Sports . . Abdul Samad Bin Idris
Minister of Works & Public Utilities ..... Lee Sang Choon **
Minister of Transport ... V. Maniokavasagnm
Minister of Education Musa Hitair.
Minister of Health Chong Hon Nyan **
Minister of Trade £ Industry Mahathir Bin Mohamad
Minister of Welfare Services .... Aishah binte Abdul C-hani
Minister of Housing & Local Government . Michael Chen Wing Sum **
Minister of Labour ............ Richard Ho Ung Hun **
Minister of Information Mohamed Bin Rahmat
Minister of Agriculture . Shariff Ahmad
Minister of Lav/ & Attorney-General . . . Seri Haji Hamzah Bin
Datuk Abu Samah
Minister of Primary Industries .... Paul Leor.g Hhee Seong **
Minister of Federal Territories .... Hussein Onn
Minister of Science, Technology & Environment . . Ong Kee Hui
Minister of Land & Regional Development ..... Abdul Kadir
Bin Yusof
Minister of Public Enterprises .... Abdul Manan Bin Othman
Minister of Energy, Telecommunications & Posts . . Leo Moggie
Minister without Portfolio ........ Mohamed Bin Nasir
Source: Eurooa Publications Limited. fn he "ir ca s t and Aunt^l -
a s i a 1 ' 7 °' (Londonj Europa Publications Limited, 197H).






WEST MALAYSIAN CHINESE REPRESENTATION
IN THE SENATE 1973
Name 'arty
Ong Yoke Lin (Appointed) NF
Lim Joo Keng (Appointed) NF
Gan m eck Yeow (Appointed) NF
Kam V/oon '.'/ah (Appointed) N?
Law Hieng Ding (Appointed) NF
Lim Keng Yaik (Appointed) NF
Seah Teng Mgaib (Appointed) NF
V/ee Khocn Hock (Appointed) NF
Chan Kwong Hon (Selangor) NF
Chong Foo Khin (Negeri Sembilan) NF
Chua Ching Cheng (Malacca) NF
Lee Loy Seng (Perak) MP
Lim Ah Sitt (Johore) NF
Ngau Ken Lock (Pahang) NF
Oh Siew Aun (Ferak) NF
Percentage of Chinese members in the Senate = 2S1 (15 out of 5*0
Percentage of elected Chinese members in the Senate = J2?o (7 out
of 2.1)
Percentage of elected Chinese members in the Senate excluding
the National Front (NF) Senators = 0"' (0 out of 22)
^Remarks in parenthesis indicate the following] the state from
which the Senator was elected or that the Senator was appointed.
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Percentage of Chinese members in the House of Representatives =
28& (32 out of 114)
Percentage of Chinese members in the House of Representatives
excluding the National Front (NF) Representatives = 10V- (11 ou-
of 114)
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The MCA who traditionally derive support from the Chi-
nese business community and funds from the powerful towkays
(Chinese entrepreneurs) , dropped three seats in the Parlia-
ment from its pre-election position. Its setback showed
Chinese disenchantment with the party over its ability to
bargain effectively with the dominantly Malay Government."'
The Chinese . • . were also unhappy over the Government's
long-term policy of transferring wealth, jobs and education
-
17<
al opportunity out of their hands to the ethnic Malays. ' J
Mid-level businessmen who traditionally support the MCA ex-
pressed concern that, as a political tool of the National
176
Front, its representative position is compromised. While
the Front amassed only 55*1^ of the total votes cast, the
177
DAP picked up 20.78$—more than the MCA. ,l The Government
reported a turnout of more than 3*5 million, or over ?o per-
173
cent of the eligible voters.
C. PAST TRENDS
During the past thirteen years, the pattern of Chinese
representation in the political hierarchy of Malaysia (fed-
eral and state levels) has been firmly established. In the
Cabinet and Senate, Chinese representation has been predict-
ably nonexistent (Figures 15-16). Chinese political power
in the House of Representatives has been characterized by
the extremely miniscule percentage of elected representa-
tives (Figure 17). This trend also extended down to the
state assemblies where the only instance of equitable Chi-
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a 56$ Chinese population ratio) occurred in the 1969 Penang
State Legislative Assembly General Election (Figures 18-28).
The continued presence of the National Front and the
UMNO, in particular, at the apex of the political ladder in
Malaysia leaves one with the impression of complete solidar-
ity in the Malay camp. But beneath the surface, intra-com-
munity issues have caused a diversification of views among
the Malays. One of the major intra-community issues centers
on the dispute among Malay state leaders for federally-funded
programs of road and bridge building, and port and airport
construction which enhance the economic well-being of their
individual state. This competition extends to the national
level where each state strongly vies for a larger piece of
the federal budget. A second issue focuses on the essence
of the National Front. Although the National Front has ac-
complished its conceptualized objective of reducing the po-
litical opposition by co-opting formerly antagonistic
parties, disparity of views among the Malays has been wide
and continues to grow. A third major issue involves the
differences between the older and younger generations of
Malays. These differences in opinion on almost every signi-
ficant issue have resulted in a movement of the younger gen-
eration away from the center position which the "Old Guard"
maintains. Although the Malay "generation gap" has become
increasingly serious in recent times, other ethnic groups
in Malaysia (especially the Chinese) have not been immune
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effected a disattachment from the traditionally compromising
stances of the elders but their move has been in the oppo-
site direction from their Malay counterparts. Although this
problem has gained added significance in recent years, the
real intra-community rivalry among the Chinese concentrates
on the following question! Who represents the Chinese com-
munity? Over the years, it has become quite apparent that
the MCA no longer possessed the "Mandate of Heaven" within
the Chinese community. Although several Chinese factions
have claimed the mandate, no clear successor has rose to the
top.
While these intra-community issues are real and signifi-
cant in portraying a clear picture of the Malaysian political
scene, they are not. the only problems which stir beneath a
surface of apparent calm. Disputes between the federal and
state governments are commonplace in the countries of South-
east Asia and Malaysia is no exception. The issues in Ma-
laysia revolve around the economic development of the states,
distribution of wealth to the rural areas of the various
states, and actual power between the governments. Over the
years, the federal government has been very slow to fund or
support economic projects beneficial to the states such as
dam and bridge construction and general infrastructure de-
velopment. Gordon P. Means summarizes the distribution of
wealth problem in the following manner:
It appears likely that they (Malay special rights and the
NEP) will produce both increased social differentiation
and increased economic disparities within the Malay com-
munity. Malays who are most likely to take full advantage
113

of special rights are those who are already urbanized, who
already have a fairly good income and already have the ed-
ucational background and motivation to exploit the oppor-
tunities created by the NEP. The peasant Malay in isolated
rural communities may get improved social services and some
marginal and indirect benefits from special rights, but it
appears unlikely that his economic condition will change as
rapidly as his expectations and aspirations rise, partly
because the government's highly publicized promises to
eradicate Malay poverty are generating a sharp rise in Ma-
lay expectations. As a new class of Malays emerges with
wealth, status and education, the social cleavages within
Malay society will likely become more pronounced and the
Malay peasantry may well acquire a more intense sense of
relative deprivation and animosity toward those who acquire,
at a far faster pace, the more visible economic benefits of
modernization. ^7v
In early 1978, the chief minister of Selangor, Datuk Harun
Idris, challenged the power of the federal government. Con-
victed for corruption (misuse of government funds), forgery
and criminal breach of trust and rebuffed by the Privy Coun-
cil in London, Datuk Harun Idris. . . decided, in his own
words, that he was "innocent from the point of law and mo-
rality. H His defiance of the federal government led to
his declaration of imprisonment in his own house of sup-
porters who refused to allow him to be incarcerated. As the
probability of intra-community (Malay) violence became in-
creasingly imminent, Harun gave himself up. Although disas-
ter was averted in this case, the resolution of conflict
between federal and state governments do not appear to be




C. P. Fitzgerald wrote the following passage concerning
the future of the Federation of Malaysia in his book, The
Third China , which was published in 1965:
The future prospects would seem dark with clouds of mis-
understanding, divergent purposes and communal ill-will.
Yet it must be remembered that one of the great gifts of
the Chinese is that of devising compromises. It is in-
herent in a nation of bargainers, and particularly well
developed in communities of merchants and businessmen.
These qualities will be needed if a solution to the dif-
ficulties of the Chinese in Malaysia is to be found, and
they will be put to a severe test.lSl
On the political scene, it appears that not only the Chinese
but also the Malays are flunking this test.
Both ethnic communities fully realize the problem con-
fronting them. Communalism has been, and still remains, the
curse of Malayan politics. Just as both parties acknow-
ledge the roots of the problem, they also realize the solu-
tion to their dilemma. However, the recognition "did not
abolish ethnocentrism but merely modernized it." J Not
long after May 1969, Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, a high UMNO
official, stated:
The politics of this country has been, and must remain
for the foreseeable future, native-based; that was the
secret of our stability and our prosperity and that is
a fact of political life which no one can simply wish
away. . . a native base which believes not in false
promises or in compulsion but in cooperation with all
other races in the country. 18^
The key word is "cooperation" for a common good and, in this
case, it is a national unity which has eluded Malaya since
U5

independence. Directly connected to cooperation and the at-
tainment of national unity is sacrifice "by both the Malays
and Chinese especially in politics and economics, respec-
tively. Gerald P. Dartford stated:
• . . the belief that. . . Malays can dominate. . . Chi-
nese. . . forever and assimilate them culturally is an
impossible dream. Any attempt to realize it could lead
to racial strife as bitter as that between Jews and Arabs
in the Middle East. 135
Will the non-Malay (Chinese) be given equal access to
the political system as Malays acquire a greater share of
benefits from the economic system? Despite the efforts of
a few Malays and Chinese who were willing to cooperate and
sacrifice for the betterment of Malaysia, "reduced Chinese
influence in the commercial sector has not been offset by
186
an improved political stature." Prime Minister Hussein
Onn's attempt to appease the Chinese by revising the NEP
(New Economic Policy) ran into opposition not only from the
1 87
UMNO politicians but also civil servants. Lee San Choon,
MCA President, put it this way:
If there are traditions and values which are more of a
burden to us than an asset. . . let us not be afraid to
change. Unless we do so, we continue to labour under a
conflict of values within the community itself and con-
flicts of views with other communities. 138
Unfortunately, the majority of Malays and Chinese apparently
do not share this willingness or desire to make the neces-
sary sacrifices. Even Dr. Tan Chee Khoon, a realistic oppo-
sition Chinese leader, acknowledged that for the next thirty
or forty years the Malays would not accept a government
189
where the non-Malays had a dominant role. 7 Mahathir Bin
116

Muhammed projects the Malay feelings perfectly in his book,
The Malay Dilemma , as he expounds the belief that "political
equality should come only after the achievement of economic
190
and educational equality." 7 This belief in "making the
other guy sacrifice first" is extremely dangerous, especial-
ly in the Malaysian environment.
Adding fuel to an already difficult and sensitive polit-
ical situation is a perceived undercurrent of extremism in
the younger generation of both ethnic communities. Instead
of drawing closer towards a middle-of-the-road position, one
senses from their statements and actions that they appear to
be headed for the extreme opposite ends of the political
spectrum. Issues such as the Merdeka Compact, "an agreement
between Malay and Chinese political leaders under which many
categories of Chinese would become citizens automatically or
on application, in exchange for assistance to the Malays in
191developing their business schools," draw out the feelings
of both ethnic communities, especially the young. Some Ma-
lays complained that the Chinese did not keep their side of
the bargain, whereas younger Chinese tend to feel their fa-
192
thers promised too much. More recently, the emotional
issue of the proposed Chinese-language Merdeka University
became prominent and deepened the rifts between communities.
United Malays National Organization (UMNO) branches, partic-
ularly its youth wing (Pemuda UMNO), made strident public
calls urging the government not to entertain the applica-
tion. 1*^ The younger generation of Chinese apparently feel
that they have been pawns and scapegoats for too long.
117

Only a more equitable distribution of Chinese represen-
tation in government would do something to effect a change
of attitudes, but it may well be that more than this will be
needed before the allegiance of the younger generation of
19^Chinese is won. If these changes do not materialize, the
sense of grievance and political alienation by the Chinese
will continue and intensify, ultimately veering more and
more towards open conflict or support of the Communist move-
ment or both. Then, the Time Bombs in Malaysia , the title
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